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DISSECTING THE STATE: THE USE OF 
FEDERAL LAW TO FREE STATE AND 
LO CAL OFFICIALS FROM STATE 
LEGISLATURES' CONTROL 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr.* 
In discussions about American federalism, it is common to 
speak of a "state government" as if it were a black box, an individ­
ual speaking with a single voice.1 State governments are, of course, 
no such thing. Rather, a "state" actually incorporates a bundle of 
different subdivisions, branches, and agencies controlled by politi­
cians who often compete with each other for electoral success and 
governmental power. In particular, these institutions compete with 
each other for the power to control federal funds and implement 
federal programs.2 
This article explores one aspect of this intrastate competition -
the extent to which federal law can delegate federal powers to spe­
cific state or local institutions even against the will of the state legis­
lature.3 Must the federal government take state institutions as it 
finds them, or can it expand these institutions' powers even in the 
teeth of state laws that seem to bar the institutions from exercising 
such federally derived powers? 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1987, J.D. 1991, Yale. - Ed. 
I gratefully acknowledge the comments of Matt Adler, Lynn Baker, Richard Briffault, Evan 
Caminker, Richard Friedman, Clayton Gillette, John Harrison, Michael Heller, Don Herzog, 
Kyle Logue, Larry Kramer, and Rick Pildes on drafts of this article. I also thank the partici­
pants of a works-in-progress workshop at the University of Texas Law School and the general 
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1. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Turning Federalism Inside Out: Intrastate Aspects of Inter­
state Regulatory Competition, 14 YALE L. & POLY. REv. 149, 155 (1996). 
2. For a discussion of such competition, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy 
of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" 
Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 875-86 (1998). 
3. In the interest of conserving space, I will not discuss the ways in which judicially­
imposed remedies such as consent decrees might be used to expand the powers of state or 
local agencies or officers. The effect of judicial orders and decrees on state or local officers' 
powers, however, is closely related to the issues raised in this article. In Missouri v. Jenkins, 
495 U.S. 33 (1990), for instance, the Supreme Court held that a federal district court could 
desegregate public schools by authorizing the school district - nominally a defendant in the 
litigation - to raise property taxes in excess of the millage limits contained in the state 
constitution. By allowing such a remedy for a constitutional violation, the Court effectively 
allowed a federal district court to dissect the state by liberating a subdivision of a state from 
the control of state law. 
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Such an issue can arise in two contexts. First, Congress or a 
federal agency might simply delegate powers to some nonfederal 
governmental institution created by state law - say, a city-while 
state law might prohibit the nonfederal institution from exercising 
such powers. For instance, the City of Tacoma and the State of 
Washington became entangled in a lengthy power struggle during 
the 1950s when the Federal Power Commission licensed the city to 
build a dam on the Cowlitz River, a tributary of the Columbia 
River. The State of Washington sought to prevent the construction 
of the dam to protect state-owned hatcheries from being flooded. 
Washington invoked a state law barring the city from constructing 
the proposed dam, but Tacoma successfully argued before the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that its federal license pre­
empted state law.4 In effect, the city -a creature of the state -
had invoked federal law to defeat the will of the state government, 
its creator. 
The federal government, however, rarely attempts so crudely to 
override state law. Instead, the issue of nonfederal officials' feder­
ally derived powers typically arises more subtly in the context of 
ambiguous federal grants. When the federal government bestows 
federal grants-in-aid on some category of state or local officials -
say, county commissions or the governor of a state - the state leg­
islature sometimes attempts to appropriate the revenue in order to 
control how it is allocated, either by directly ordering the federal 
money to be spent according to state priorities or by reducing state 
aid by the amount of the federal grant, thus effectively converting 
federal funds to state purposes. In response to these conversion 
attempts, federal grant law may then give the initial recipient the 
power to resist the state legislature's attempt to appropriate or off­
set the federal funds. The question then arises: Who controls the 
federal money? 
For instance, at issue in Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood 
School District5 was Congress's bestowal of federal funds on county 
governments to compensate them for tax losses resulting from the 
presence of federally owned, tax-exempt land (national parks, for 
4. See Washington Dept. of Grune v. Federal Power Commn., 207 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 
1953). The Washington Supreme Court reached a different conclusion in City of Tacoma v. 
Taxpayers of Tacoma, 262 P.2d 214, 229 (Wash. 1953) [hereinafter City of Tacoma I], a deci­
sion that the U.S. Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that it was precluded by the Ninth 
Circuit's earlier decision of the same issue, see City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 
U.S. 320, 340 (1958) [hereinafter City of Tacoma Ill]. I discuss this convoluted controversy at 
infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text and infra section III.A. 
5. 469 U.S. 256 (1985). 
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instance) located within their boundaries. To control this federal 
money, the South Dakota legislature had enacted a statute requir­
ing the county to pay over sixty percent of the federal revenues to 
the local school district.6 The county, however, successfully argued 
that the federal grant preempted state law by giving the county un­
fettered and final authority to dispose of the federal revenue as it 
chose.7 
A similar conflict arises when state legislatures attempt to ap­
propriate federal grant revenue that has been awarded by the fed­
eral government to the governor. Several state supreme courts 
have wrestled with the question of whether state legislatures may 
appropriate such federal funds. Invoking state constitutional sepa­
ration of powers doctrine, some state courts have held that the state 
legislature cannot exercise appropriation power over the money, at 
least absent clear federal authorization for such appropriation.8 
This article attempts to answer the thorny constitutional and 
statutory questions that arise whenever the federal government 
uses either its regulatory power or its spending power to dissect the 
state, unpacking the black box of "the state" to liberate certain 
state or local institutions from the control of state laws. Should 
Congress be permitted to insulate local governments and state 
agencies from the control of the state legislature through preemp­
tive regulatory legislation? And when Congress uses its spending 
power to dissect the state, how should courts construe ambiguities 
in the grant programs? Should courts construe federal statutes and 
state constitutions to protect the freedom of the state's subparts -
its local governments, agencies, governor, etc. -from the centraliz­
ing power of the state legislature? To retard it and encourage legis­
lative control? Or is there no intelligible way to generalize about 
these institutional questions across different grant programs? 
As Part I of this article explains, neither precedent nor policy 
provides any clear guidance on these issues. Many courts and com­
mentators seem to assume without argument that the federal gov­
ernment may not bestow powers on local governments when those 
powers are forbidden by the relevant state statutory or constitu-
6. See S.D. CODIFIED LAws §5-11-6 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1998). 
7. See Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 269. I discuss Lawrence County at infra notes 104-19 
and accompanying text. 
8. See Navajo Tribe v. Arizona Dept. of Admin., 528 P.2d 623' (Ariz. 1975); Mac Manus v. 
Love, 499 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1972); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 378 N.E.2d 433 (Mass. 
1978); State ex reL Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974). I discuss these cases in 
more detail at infra notes 155-156 and accompanying text. 
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tional law.9 Under this theory, mayors, governors, city councils, or 
county commissions can act as the agents of the federal government 
only if state law does not forbid it. I call this view the "principle of 
state supremacy." Notwithstanding conventional opinion to the 
contrary, there are no precedents from either the Supreme Court or 
any lower court explaining why or even whether the principle of 
state supremacy is actually part of established constitutional doc­
trine. As I argue in section I.A, one can make colorable arguments 
that the principle of state supremacy is implied by the Court's "state 
autonomy" precedents such as New York v. United States10 and 
Printz v. United States.11 But these are merely plausible arguments, 
and there are plausible arguments on the other side. 
Considerations of sensible policy also do not unambiguously re­
solve this impasse in the precedents. On one hand, there is a re­
spectable argument (which I lay out in section 1.B) that the 
principle of state supremacy helps promote cost-effective and politi­
cally accountable local governance. Congress is probably not as 
well-suited for designing institutions for local governance as state 
legislatures. But, on the other hand, the principle of state 
supremacy has costs as well as benefits: it could conceivably pose a 
threat to cooperative federalism.12 As I suggest in section l.C, the 
danger of state supremacy is that state laws might inefficiently pre­
vent nonfederal officials and institutions -governors and state leg­
islatures, counties, cities, special districts, and other state agencies 
-from competing with each other for federal funds. This intergov­
ernmental competition is useful, because it allows Congress to by­
pass nonfederal officials who fail to implement federal policy 
faithfully and instead to delegate power to other nonfederal offi­
cials who demonstrate greater fidelity to federal policies. But such 
intergovernmental competition vanishes if the principle of state 
supremacy allows the state legislature to centralize the structure of 
state government and bar nonfederal officials from implementing 
federal policy. 
9. See infra note 21. 
10. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
11. 521 U.S. 98 (1997). 
12. "Cooperative federalism" refers to intergovernmental cooperation between the fed­
eral and state or local governments, under which nonfederal officials implement federal pol­
icy, frequently receiving federal grant revenue in return. For general accounts of such 
intergovernmental relations, see TIMOTHY CONLAN, NEW FEDERALISM: INTERGOVERNMEN· 
TAL REFORM FROM NIXON TO REAGAN (1988); DAVID WALKER, THE REBIRTii OF FEDER­
ALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD WASHINGTON (1995); DEIL S. WRIGHT, UNDERSTANDING 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (3d ed. 1988). 
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The question, therefore, arises whether there is some mecha­
nism by which the costs and benefits of the principle of state 
supremacy might be correctly balanced. In Part II, I propose such a 
device - a canon of construction that I shall call "the presumption 
of institutional autonomy." Federal grant programs and state stat­
utes and constitutions are frequently ambiguous about the role of 
the state legislature in controlling access to state and local institu­
tions. The presumption of institutional autonomy instructs courts 
to construe this ambiguity to maximize the ability of state and local 
governmental institutions to spend such federal revenue free from 
state legislative supervision. The presumption of institutional au­
tonomy preserves federal access to nonfederal officials by allowing 
these officials to carry·out federal policies absent a clear statement 
to the contrary in state laws. Such a "plain statement" rule is analo­
gous to federal-preserving canons of construction used in decisions 
like Gregory v. Ashcroft.13 The plain statement rule in Gregory 
protects federalism through the national political process by barring 
federal intrusions into state sovereignty absent a clear congressional 
statement to the contrary.14 Likewise the presumption of institu­
tional autonomy protects nationalism through the state political pro­
cess by barring state intrusion into federal intergovernmental 
relations absent a clear state-law provision to the contrary.15 
In Part II, I explore how such a presumption might affect the 
judicial construction of federal grants to local governments16 and 
govemors.17 Finally, in Part ID, I explore whether the presumption 
of institutional autonomy might be used to protect local govern­
ments from state control outside the context of federal grant pro­
grams. The article examines two famous cases - Bridgeport's 
petition for bankruptcy, which was resisted by Connecticut's state 
government,18 and the City of Tacoma's effort to build a dam on the 
Cowlitz River, which was resisted by Washington's state govem­
ment19 - to explore whether the federal government should be 
13. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
14. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461. 
15. For a general account of how canons of statutory construction might be viewed as 
devices for advancing important polices or constitutional values, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989). 
16. See infra section II.B.1. 
17. See infra section II.B.2. 
18. See In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991). 
19. The litigation surrounding the Cowlitz dam was convoluted and protracted, involving 
one decision by the Ninth Circuit, four decisions by the Washington Supreme Court, and one 
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Washington Dept. of Game v. Federal Power 
Commn., 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 371 P.2d 938 
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permitted to bestow powers on cities using regulations rather than 
grants. 
J. THE PRESUMPTION OF STATE SUPREMACY: 
PROMOTING INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMPETITION 
THROUGH LIMITS ON FEDERAL POWER 
As a matter of either precedent or sensible policy, what sort of 
role should the federal government play in defining the powers of 
nonfederal governmental institutions? Courts and commentators 
frequently suggest without much elaboration that Congress simply 
cannot authorize state or local officials to perform acts forbidden by 
state law.20 I call this theory the "principle of state supremacy." 
The difficulty with this theory is that it is impossible to make an 
unambiguous determination of whether support exists for this prin­
ciple in either precedent or policy. 
As I explain in section I.A, the Supreme Court has never clearly 
embraced the principle that the federal government cannot dissect 
the state and liberate state and local officials from the state legisla­
ture's control. Considerations of sensible policy might provide a 
stronger basis for a rule against dissection of the state: as explained 
in section I.B, there are good reasons to believe that when Congress 
dissects the state and liberates state or local officials from the con­
straints of state law, Congress weakens those institutions for the 
purpose of local self-governance. By "local self-governance," I 
mean the cost-effective delivery of local public goods in a manner 
that is politically accountable to local residents. Congress is simply 
not as well-suited as the states for creating institutions that deliver 
local public goods to the residents of a state in a politically account­
able and cost-effective way. Therefore, one might insist on the prin­
ciple of state supremacy as a way to protect nonfederal institutions 
from being undermined by ill-advised federal efforts to liberate 
them from state law. 
But even this policy-based defense of the principle must be 
qualified: section I.C explains, the principle of state supremacy has 
costs as well as benefits. It is conceivable that the principle of state 
supremacy might lead to greater centralization of the state, thereby 
increasing the state government's capacity to engage in strategic be-
(Wash. 1962) (hereinafter City of Tacoma IV]; City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 307 
P.2d 567 (Wash. 1957) (hereinafter City of Tacoma 11], revd., City of Tacoma III, supra note 4, 
357 U.S. 320 (1958); City of Tacoma I, supra note 4, 262 P.2d 214 (Wash. 1953); State ex rel. 
City of Tacoma v. Rogers, 203 P.2d 325 (Wash. 1949). 
20. See infra note 21. 
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havior when bargaining with the federal government. Both federal 
and state officials frequently try to deceive each other about their 
available resources, need for assistance, willingness to terminate in­
tergovernmental grants, and likelihood of future noncompliance 
with grant conditions. This willingness to provide misinformation 
to the other level of government can obviously make intergovern­
mental relations more costly. It is possible that the principle of 
state supremacy might increase the states' willingness to engage in 
such strategic bargaining, thereby undermining useful intergovern­
mental arrangements. 
In short, the question of whether the federal government ought 
to be permitted to dissect the state creates an apparently stark di­
lemma. Either allow such dissection, and undermine the efficacy of 
nonfederal institutions for the purposes of state and local govern­
ance, or forbid it, and undermine the possibility of cooperative fed­
eralism. In Part II, I suggest a way to escape this dilemma. The 
purpose of Part I, however, is simply to show that neither precedent 
nor policy offers an easy way out. 
A. The Ambiguous Case in Precedent for State Supremacy 
At first glance, one might take the principle of state supremacy 
to be a truism. After all, there is a widespread assumption among 
courts, politicians, and political scientists that the federal govern­
ment must take nonfederal governmental institutions as it finds 
them, accepting the limits that state law imposes on such institu­
tions.21 So, for instance, in rejecting the idea that the City of 
Tacoma could use its license issued by the Federal Power Commis­
sion to condemn state-owned land in violation of state law, the 
Washington Supreme Court stated: 
If it be held that the Federal government may endow a state-created 
municipality with powers greater than those given it by its creator, the 
21. For an early judicial statement of this proposition, see Ashton v. Cameron County 
Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936). Ashton held that the Municipal 
Bankruptcy Act of 1934 was unconstitutional because it regulated municipalities' power to 
declare bankruptcy, a matter that the Court held must be reserved to the state governments. 
The logic of Ashton was, however, somewhat strained: although the Court relied on the 
proposition that the state government had the exclusive right to control its own subdivisions, 
the federal act in question did not deprive any state of such control, as no municipality could 
file under the Act without permission from its state government. Thus, Ashton can be seen 
as limiting not merely the power of the federal government but also the power of the states to 
consent to any enlargement of federal powers. See generally MARTHA DERTHICK, THE IN­
FLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN MAssACHUSETTS 16 (1970) ( describ­
ing tradition that federal government can have access to local governments only by securing 
consent of state governments). Dell Wright refers to this view as the "coordinate authority" 
model of federalism. See WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 40-43. 
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state legislature, a momentous and novel theory of constitutional gov­
ernment has been evolved that will eventually relegate a sovereign 
state to a position of impotence never contemplated by the framers of 
our constitutions, state and Federal.22 
More recently, the New Mexico Supreme Court expressed a similar 
sentiment when it rejected the possibility that federal law could give 
a governor the power to ignore contrary state law.23 The New Mex­
ico Governor asserted that the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act (IGRA) gave him authority to form compacts with Indian 
tribes concerning gambling on reservations even if state law prohib­
ited him from entering into such compacts. The court doubted 
whether "Congress, in enacting the IGRA, sought to invest state 
governors with powers in excess of those that the governors possess 
under state law."24 In any case, the court was also "confident that 
the United States Supreme Court would reject any such attempt by 
Congress to enlarge state gubernatorial power."25 
Why such confidence? An inspection of precedent suggests that 
the basis for such assurance is hardly obvious. This is not to say 
that the principle is indefensible, but only that courts have not yet 
provided a coherent justification. One might try to defend the prin­
ciple of state supremacy by invoking the notion that local govern­
ments are "creatures of the state," agencies that the state 
government is free to destroy or alter as it pleases. This doctrine is 
most frequently associated with the Court's decision in Hunter v. 
City of Pittsburgh,26 in which the Court upheld Pennsylvania's con­
solidation of the town of Allegheny with the City of Pittsburgh, de­
claring that the "number, nature and duration of the powers 
conferred upon these [municipal] corporations and the territory 
over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of 
the State. "27 But one can trace such a view back at least to Trustees 
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,28 in which Justice Story distin­
guished between private and municipal corporations, stating that 
only the former were protected from state law by the Contract 
Clause of Article I, Section 10.29 Hunter simply extends Justice 
22. City of Tacoma II, supra note 19, 307 P.2d at 567. 
23. See State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995). 
24. Johnson, 904 P.2d at 26. 
25. Johnson, 904 P.2d at 26. 
26. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
27. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178. 
28. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 {1819). 
29. Dartmouth College, 11 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 668, 682-83. For a discussion of the origins 
and history of this distinction between private and municipal corporations, see Joan C. Wtl-
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Story's argument to hold that, unlike private corporations, local 
governments are not protected from state legislation also by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Hunter-Dartmouth College doctrine, however, is a poor 
source for the idea that Congress cannot enlarge the power of local 
governments without the state legislature's consent. Hunter states 
only that state or local officials' loss of office or power is not a "tak­
ing" of property, impairment of contract, or loss of liberty or prop­
erty without due process of law within the meaning of Article I, 
Section 10 or the Fourteenth Amendment.30 To be sure, such a 
doctrine might place a limit on some congressional powers: Con­
gress arguably cannot invoke Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to enlarge the powers of local governments, because local 
governments would have no Fourteenth Amendment right for Con­
gress to enforce.31 But there is no compelling reason why such a 
doctrine would have any effect on Congress's other powers, such as 
its power to regulate interstate commerce, that do not depend on a 
preexisting constitutional right.32 
One might argue that, under Hunter, the state legislature is con­
stitutionally entitled to speak for the subdivisions, departments, and 
agencies of the state, because such subparts of the state simply have 
no legal identity apart from the state legislature. Under this reason­
ing, the state legislature must be able to veto its subdivisions' or 
departments' participation in federal regulatory schemes, because 
such subparts of the state lack the power to speak for themselves. 
But the Court has never accepted such a formalistic equation of a 
Iiams, The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U. 
L. REv. 369 (1985). 
30. See Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-81. 
31. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). To the extent that the voting 
rights of citizens are affected by a state's allocation of power among its municipalities, the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment might 
limit state control of its subdivisions. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457 
(1982); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 341 (1960). Congress might, therefore, have the 
power to limit states' control over their municipalities as an appropriate way to enforce the 
voting rights of citizens under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See, e.g., City of 
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (requiring city's proposed annexation of 
county territory to be precleared by the Department of Justice pursuant to § 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act). 
32. Several lower courts have suggested that the Hunter doctrine does not limit 
Congress's powers to bestow statutory rights on local governments. See Rogers v. Brockette, 
588 F.2d 1057, 1064 (5th Cir. 1979); San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 
283 (S.D. Cal. 1978). Such a doctrine might be rooted in fears that the courts are institution­
ally incapable of deciding the difficult questions of institutional design raised by disputes 
about local governments' powers and territorial jurisdiction. See Richard Briffault, Who 
Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 339 
(1993). 
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state and its subdivisions. To the contrary, the Court has expressly 
rejected such a view: according to the Court, counties and munici­
palities do not enjoy immunity from lawsuits under the Eleventh 
Amendment, because the Eleventh Amendment protects only "one 
of the United States" from suits in federal court, and counties and 
cities are not agents of the state governments but rather independ­
ent corporations that speak for themselves and not the state.33 If 
local governments really are independent corporations, as the 
Court's Eleventh Amendment "arm-of-the-state" jurisprudence im­
plies,34 then the federal government should be able to delegate fed­
eral responsibilities to them just as it delegates federal duties to 
private nonprofit corporations (for example, Howard University, 
the Red Cross, etc.), preempting in the process all state legislation 
that might interfere with the federal license of the federal agent. 
Rhetoric about municipalities being "creatures of the state" is 
especially unhelpful given that the federal government frequently 
authorizes private corporations to administer federal law, even 
though such private organizations are creatures of state law. So, for 
instance, few would doubt that if a private electrical utility coopera­
tive obtained a federal license to build a dam on a navigable water­
way, then that license would preempt state laws barring the 
construction of the dam.35 This would be so, even though the coop­
erative is in some sense a "creature of the state," because state laws 
ordinarily determine how one goes about forming cooperatives. 
Likewise, when the Resolution Trust Corporation (RT C) takes over 
failed savings and loans (S&L) as their receiver and is subrogated 
into the rights of the S&L, no one doubts that the RT C can effec­
tively extend the powers of the private S&L by preempting some 
state-law defenses- usury, etc. - that might otherwise be asserted 
against the RT C's claim.36 This is so even though the S&L is a crea­
ture of the state, and its organization is rooted in state law. Ex­
tending this reasoning, federal agencies should be able to convert 
willing municipalities into federal agents, despite the fact that the 
33. See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
34. For an overview of the jurisprudence, see Alex E. Rogers, Note , Clothing State Gov­
ernmental Entities in Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the· 
State Doctrine, 92 Co LUM. L. REv. 1243 (1992). 
35. See First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Commn., 328 U.S. 152 , 164 
(1946) ("To require [the co-op) to secure ... a state permit . . •  as a condition precedent to 
securing a federal license for the same project under the Federal Power Act would vest in 
[the state] a veto power over the federal project."). 
36. Of course, Congress would still have to authorize such preemption, and a presump· 
tion against wholesale creation of federal common law might lead courts to reject implicit 
preemption of state-law defenses. See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC , 512 U.S. 79 (1994). 
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municipalities are "creatures of the state." This challenge is espe­
cially powerful given that several prominent legal scholars have ar­
gued that municipalities ought to enjoy the same powers as private 
corporations.37 Even if one agrees with the dominant view that 
public corporations ought not to enjoy the same protection enjoyed 
by private organizations as a matter of federal constitutional law,38 
one might still give Congress the discretion to bestow a sort of fed­
eral home rule on municipalities as a matter of federal statutory 
law. 
A second and apparently more promising basis for the principle 
of state supremacy is the doctrine of state autonomy.39 The Court 
has recently revived its state autonomy jurisprudence with two deci­
sions, New York v. United States4° and Printz v. United States, 41 both 
of which struck down federal laws that imposed on nonfederal offi­
cials affirmative duties - to take title to low-level radioactive 
waste, and to regulate the purchase of :firearms, respectively. In the 
somewhat colorful language of New York, "Congress may not sim­
ply 'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory pro­
gram.' "42 One might argue that, when the federal government in­
sulates state or local officials from the limits imposed by state law, 
the federal government somehow commandeers the state govern­
ments' regulatory processes by forcing the state government to 
make its officials available to enforce the federal government's reg­
ulatory scheme. 
But this sort of argument faces an obvious initial difficulty: fed­
eral law does not require anyone to do anything when it preempts 
state laws that limit the powers of state or local officials. At most, 
such federal laws simply require the state to remove certain restric­
tions on the power of subordinate officials so that those officials can 
voluntarily assume federal duties. Such federal preemption of 
state-law limits on state or local governmental institutions differs 
37. The most famous exposition of this position remains Gerald E. Frug, The City as a 
Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1057 {1980). For a criticism of Frog's argument that cities 
are powerless, see Richard Briffault, Our Localism (part II), 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 346 (1990). 
38. For some defenses of the distinction between public and private corporations, see 
Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1519 {1982). 
39. This "state autonomy" jurisprudence was the basis for the New Mexico Supreme 
Court's assertion that Congress could not enlarge the power of the governor to negotiate 
compacts with Indian tribes. See supra note 8. 
40. 505 U. S. 144 {1992). 
41. 521 U.S. 898 {1997). 
42. New York, 505 U. S. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Vrrginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 288 {1981)). 
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from other types of federal preemption. Maybe Congress cannot 
"commandeer" - that is, force - county sheriffs to perform back­
ground checks on gun purchasers. But suppose such sheriffs want 
to perform such background checks and state law prohibits them 
from doing so. Why cannot federal law liberate such officials from 
the constraints of state law by authorizing them to do what state law 
forbids? 
Moreover, state autonomy jurisprudence seems even more inap­
plicable if, as New York suggests, such jurisprudence is rooted in the 
need to protect political accountability.43 One can perhaps argue 
that Congress would deflect the voters' hostility from itself onto 
state legislatures by forcing state legislatures to locate sites for low­
level radioactive waste. In such a case, Congress forces an unwill­
ing political body to take a highly visible and very unpopular action; 
voters arguably might misattribute responsibility for such an action 
to the state legislature, its immediate and visible cause, rather than 
to Congress, its remote but actual cause. But such an argument 
based on political accountability seems much harder to make when 
Congress simply authorizes a state or local official to undertake 
some action in violation of state law. In that case, the state legisla­
ture is not required to take any visible action that might invite retri­
bution from affected voters; the only visible actor is the state or 
local official who chooses to act pursuant to congressional authori­
zation and therefore is properly accountable for the costs of the 
action. 
One might make a stronger argument for the principle of state 
supremacy by abandoning the rhetoric of political accountability -
never a persuasive rhetorical trope in any case - and instead focus­
ing on the distributive injustice and inefficiency of "comman­
deering" legislation. As I have argued elsewhere, 44 
"commandeering" legislation is analogous to a regulatory taking: in 
effect, such legislation confiscates state and local governments' re­
sources, placing them at the disposal of the federal government. 
If one views "commandeering" legislation as analogous to a reg­
ulatory taking and abandons the theme of political accountability, 
43. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168. 
44. See Hills, supra note 2. Such confiscation of public organizations' resources, like con­
fiscation of private organizations' property, is distributively unjust and economically ineffi­
cient it forces public organizations (and the coalitions of voters that control them) to bear 
the costs of federal programs serving needs that state and local governments do not create , 
and it erodes the value of state and local political involvement to voters and politicians , 
reducing their incentive to vote, run for office, or otherwise engage in state or local political 
activity. 
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then the case for the principle of state supremacy seems much 
stronger. The federally empowered state or local official, after all, 
necessarily cannot undertake any official federal action - for ex­
ample, gas up the squad car, deposit a paycheck, boot up the com­
puter, post a letter, turn on a light in her office - without 
consuming tax dollars authorized or appropriated for other pur­
poses. So, for instance, if the federal government authorized 
county sheriffs to perform background checks on gun purchasers, 
then such sheriffs would necessarily expend nonfederal tax revenue 
for such federal duties: background checks require activities - tel­
ephone calls, staff time, office supplies, computers - that all con­
sume either state or county tax revenue. If the county sheriff 
expends such revenue for purposes prohibited by the legislative 
body that appropriated the revenue, then the county sheriff effec­
tively confiscates such revenue for federal purposes just as surely as 
if he or she were a Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire­
arms agent who occupied state buildings to perform background 
checks. 
In short, by authorizing state or local officials to implement fed­
eral programs in violation of state policies, the federal government 
effectively confiscates state resources and uses them for the benefit 
of the federal government. To the extent that New York and Printz 
forbid Congress from confiscating state tax revenue and regulatory 
capacity for federal ends, one might argue that they should also bar 
the federal government from authorizing subordinate state or local 
officials to engage in such forbidden confiscation.45 
Yet even this analogy to regulatory takings does not conclu­
sively entail the principle of state supremacy. The difficulty with 
such an argument is that, when the federal government authorizes 
some subordinate state or local officer to implement a federal pro­
gram, it does not merely redistribute power and money to itself; it 
also redistributes power among state institutions. One can argue 
that such federal arbitration among competing governmental enti­
ties is more consistent with the purpose of a federalist system than 
purely federal �ggrandizement of power at the expense of the state 
as a whole. Take, for instance, federal laws that enable cities to 
ignore limits imposed on them by state law: such federal laws vio-
45. Indeed, the conflict in New York can be regarded as an intrastate quarrel between the 
governor and the state legislature in which the federal government took the side of the gover­
nor. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments of 1985 had been endorsed 
by Governor C uomo (and the National Governors' Association); it was the New York state 
legislature that balked at implementing the federal law by choosing actual waste sites. 
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late the principle of state supremacy, but they also might promote 
the very policies that federalism is said to advance by empowering 
local governments. It is frequently said that federalism broadens 
opportunities for political participation.46 But one would think that 
federal empowerment of local governments would be well­
calculated to promote such an end even better than control of local 
governments by state governments. Elected city officeholders, after 
all, are elected from smaller constituencies than state officeholders, 
and there are many more local elected officials than state elected 
officials. Cities rather than states, therefore, might arguably be a 
more natural home for small-scale democracy that is "close to the 
people." 
Put more generally, federal laws that redistribute power among 
state and local governmental institutions do not unambiguously 
weaken nonfederal institutions and thereby undercut the purpose 
of a federal system of government. Such laws, therefore, might be 
distinguishable from the laws struck down in New York and Printz, 
which simply supplanted nonfederal power with federal power. To 
continue the analogy to regulatory takings, one might draw an anal­
ogy here between federal laws that allocate powers among 
nonfederal institutions and land-use regulations that arbitrate be­
tween the claims of competing landowners. As Joseph Sax notes, 
when government performs the function of arbitrating between 
landowners, the courts are much less likely to find an unconstitu­
tional taking than when the government acts as an "entrepreneur" 
and simply takes over private land for its own purposes.47 Like­
wise, one also might argue that the courts should distinguish be­
tween federal laws that arbitrate between competing nonfederal 
institutions and federal laws that commandeer such institutions for 
federal purposes. 
Missouri v. Jenkins48 suggests that the Court might accept pre­
cisely such a distinction between federal laws that commandeer 
nonfederal officers' services and federal laws that preempt state-law 
limits on nonfederal officers' authority. The Jenkins Court held 
that a district court could enjoin a state constitutional limit on mil­
lage so that a school district - nominally a defendant - could 
raise property taxes sufficiently to cover the cost of the judicial rem­
edy for segregated schools. In distinguishing this remedy from a 
46. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 458 {1991) (stating that the federal struc­
ture "increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes"). 
47. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 67 {1964). 
48. 495 U.S. 33 (1990). 
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direct judicial order to raise taxes (which, according to the Court, 
exceeded the district court's equitable discretion), the Court noted 
that, by simply preempting state-law limits on the school district's 
powers, the district court gave "proper respect for the integrity and 
function of local government institutions" that were "ready, willing, 
and - but for the operation of state law curtailing their powers -
able to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights them­
selves."49 In other words, the Court distinguished between a fed­
eral command that a state raise taxes - "commandeering" of a 
state - and a federal command that a state allow one of its subdivi­
sions to raise taxes - dissection of the state - forbidding the for­
mer but allowing the latter. 
Of course, the state in Jenkins had been found to have deprived 
individuals of equal protection through de jure segregation of pub­
lic schools.50 Under these circumstances, the federal court would 
have been justified in "commandeering" the state's regulatory 
processes to create a remedy for the violation if no less intrusive 
remedy were available.51 This holding, therefore, is distinguishable 
from situations in which Congress attempts to dissect the state 
where the state is innocent of any constitutional violation. How­
ever, Jenkins's willingness to distinguish between federal judicial 
decrees that compel state taxation and decrees that enjoin state lim­
its on local taxes suggests that dissection might be regarded by the 
Court as less intrusive than "commandeering." Such a holding cau­
tions against an easy inference that, because Congress cannot com­
mandeer a state's regulatory processes, therefore, Congress also 
cannot liberate a subdivision from the control of the state 
government. 
In short, the argument rooted in state autonomy precedent is 
not groundless, but it is also not overwhelmingly persuasive. Its 
force depends on whether the federal government should play a 
role in allocating power among state and local political institutions. 
If the federal government should play such a role, then the case 
against federal empowerment of state or local officials is weak. If 
not, then the case is much stronger. It is no good to pretend that 
such an issue can be resolved by parsing a handful of state auton­
omy (or any other) judicial decisions; the question of the proper 
49. See Jenkins, 495 U. S. at 51. 
50. See Jenkins, 495 U. S. at 37. 
51. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 493 U. S. 265, 276 (1990) {holding that contempt 
sanctions can be imposed by judge against city to enforce consent decree remedying constitu­
tional and statutory violations). 
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role of the federal government in defining local political institutions 
is fundamentally a policy question. Therefore, it is to this policy 
question this article now turns. 
B. The Case for State Supremacy in Terms of Policy: 
How Dissection of the State Unnecessarily Undermines 
Local Self-Governance 
What policy argument can be made in favor of the principle of 
state supremacy? As I shall argue below, there are reasons to be­
lieve that the federal government's dissection of the state tends to 
undermine the efficacy of nonfederal governmental institutions for 
the purpose of local self-governance. The natural place to begin 
this inquiry is to examine the federal government's track record in 
creating institutions for local self-governance. Although the evi­
dence is admittedly sketchy and anecdotal, this track record does 
not inspire confidence. 
The federal government's main efforts in creating local govern­
ments have been in conditions attached to grants-in-aid, requiring 
cities and states to set up functionally specialized agencies staffed 
by professionals who deliver a single service - for example, hous­
ing, income maintenance, or education - insulated from control by 
elected policy generalists like mayors, legislators or governors.52 
How sensible were these institutional choices? It became a cliche 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s to denounce such arrangements as 
immune from democratic control, inefficient, uncoordinated, cha­
otic, and generally unaccountable.53 Commentators have repeat­
edly complained that such federally sponsored governments led to 
fragmented policymaking because each state or local agency pur­
sued its specialty - housing, education, environmental protection 
- in isolation from other state or local policies.54 In addition, it 
has been a common complaint that such functionally specialized 
state and local agencies were often more loyal to the federal agency 
from which they received their federal funding than to the local or 
52. See Hills, supra note 2, at 860 & n.167. 
53. For a summary of the literature, see Thomas J. Anton, Intergovernmental Change in 
the United States: An Assessment of the Literature, in Puauc SECTOR PERFORMANCE: A 
CoNCEPTIJAL TURNING POINT 15 (Trudi C. Miller ed., 1984). 
54. Such fragmentation prompted the late Edward Muskie, then chair of the Senate 
Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, to hold hearings in 1966 to investigate 
whether the bureaucracies created by federal grant programs were inefficient and uncoordi­
nated, concluding that indeed they were. See Creative Federalism Hearings: Before the Sub­
comm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, 89th Cong. 
(1966). 
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state governments for whom they ostensibly worked.55 Exploiting 
their close relationship with the counterpart federal agency and 
their greater familiarity with the federal grant process, such agen­
cies would use federal policies to resist oversight by state or local 
politicians, arguing - sometimes misleadingly - that the demands 
of state or local politicians were inconsistent with federal law and 
would result in the forfeiture of federal funds. The ACIR dubbed 
such arrangements "creative feudalism" to highlight the manner in 
which each functional bureaucracy guarded its fiefdom from polit­
ical control.56 A spate of implementation studies decried the feder­
ally sponsored structures of cooperative federalism as inefficient, 
self-defeating, dysfunctional, and ungovemable.57 
A preliminary word of caution is in order at this point: it is 
important to separate measured analysis from hyperbole. More re­
cent empirical research suggests that many conventional criticisms 
of the intergovernmental bureaucracy sponsored by the federal 
government are overstated.58 More importantly, the structural inef­
ficiencies of creative federalism were not gratuitous. The federal 
government imposed various "single agency" and "qualified per­
sonnel" requirements on the states because they feared - with 
good reason - that state politicians were likely to be disloyal to 
certain national goals, such as the provision of public goods to non­
residents or the redistribution of wealth. It is a familiar point that 
nonfederal politicians have structural incentives to disregard certain 
national goals. For instance, state and local officials have an incen­
tive to undermine federal policies that redistribute wealth to low­
income groups, because such federal policies attract households 
55. See, e.g., Mark C. Gordon , Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constmcting a New 
Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & PoLY. REv. 187, 211-12 
(1996) (discussing the danger that informal relations among state and federal intergovern­
mental bureaucracy might suppress opportunities for citizen involvement in politics). 
56. See DONALD H. HAIDER, WHEN GOVERNMENTS CoME TO WASHINGTON: GOVER­
NORS, MAYORS, AND !NrERGOVERNMENTAL LoBBYING 60 (1974). For other accounts of the 
hostility to the complexity and redundancy of the intergovernmental system of categorical 
grants in the 1960s and early 1970s , see CoNLAN, supra note 12, at 45-50; GARTH L. MAN­
GUM, THE EMERGENCE OF MANPOWER POLICY 70-81 (1969). 
57. For examples of such implementation literature, see EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLE­
MENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A BILL BECOMES LAW (1977); MARTHA 
DERTHICK, NEW TOWNS IN-TOWN: WHY A FEDERAL PROGRAM FAILED (1972); JEFFREY L. 
PRESSMAN & AARON B. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: How GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN 
WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND (2d ed. 1979). For colorful examples of how such 
federal regulatory requirements might create obvious inefficiencies, see TERRY SANFORD, 
STORM OVER THE STATES 90-96 (1967). 
58. See PAULE. PETERSON ET AL., WHEN FEDERALISM WoR.KS 216-17 (1986) (noting 
that typical attacks on Johnson's Creative Federalism and Nixon's New Federalism fre­
quently "substitute flamboyant rhetoric for careful analysis"). 
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with low capacity to contribute to the tax base of the city and in­
crease the need for costly governmental services. In particular, 
elected officials will have a greater incentive to divert federal funds 
away from the federally mandated redistributive purposes much 
more than the nonelected policy professionals employed by state 
and local agencies - so-called "policy specialists."59 Likewise, 
state and local politicians have an incentive to be profligate with 
national funds because their residents do not bear the full tax bur­
den of raising federal revenue. 60 I will return to these points in 
section l.C, when I discuss the costs of state supremacy. 
Nevertheless, whatever their advantages for the pursuit of na­
tional goals, there is little doubt that the structures imposed by the 
federal government were not well-suited for local self-governance. 
That is, these structures did not ensure the cost-effective delivery of 
local public goods in a manner politically accountable to local resi­
dents.61 In short, the federal goveI'Ilil}.ent seems to have certain ten­
dencies toward unnecessary bureaucratic sclerosis. Such a 
conclusion should hardly be a surprise: there are several institu­
tional reasons to expect that the federal government will perform 
less effectively than state governments in supervising local agencies, 
whether they be field offices or municipalities. 
First and most important is the problem of governmental over­
load: the federal government has an insufficient number of elected 
policy generalists to monitor effectively 39,000 local governments.62 
59. The classic statement of these state and local incentives to avoid redistribution of 
wealth is PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 71-82 (1981). Peterson and Mark Rom provide 
empirical evidence suggesting that state governments struggle to avoid becoming "welfare 
magnets" in PAUL E. PETERSON & MAruc C. RoM , WELFARE MAGNETS (1990). According 
to Peterson and Rom, states cut their AFDC and Medicaid benefits by $30 per recipient fo r  
every $100 o f  benefits paid b y  the state i n  the preceding year above the level of benefits paid 
by the average contiguous state. See id. at 75-83. For more recent findings confirmin g these 
results, see Mark Carl Rom et al. , Interstate Competition and Welfare Policy. Pusuus, Sum­
mer 1998, at 17. A decade after Senator Musk ie's hearings denouncing the inefficiency of 
federal bureaucratic intrusion into state and local governments, William Proxmire held hear­
ings to denounce local politicians' habitual diversion of Community Development Block 
Grant money from assistance of low-income neighborhoods to economic development. For 
an account of such hearings , see MICHAEL J. RICH, FEDERAL POLICYMAKING AND THB 
PooR: NATIONAL GOALS, LocAL CHOICES, AND DISTRIBUTIONAL OUTCOMES 341- 42 (1993). 
60. For an instance in which control of federal grants by federal agency specialists may 
have been necessary to prevent waste of federal money, see Martha Derthick , Professional 
Fiefdoms Appraised: The Case of Social Services, Pusuus, Spring 1976, at 121-34. 
61. Even Peterson, Rabe, and Wong note that the intergovernmental system of the 1960s 
and 1970s suffered initially from excessively detailed regulations, tight audits, and overly 
complex evaluations that were relaxed only in response to complaints by state and local poli­
ticians about excessive federal interference with nonfederal political structures. See id. at 
140- 47. 
62. In 1987, the Bureau of the Census reported 3,042 counties, 19,205 municipalities, 
16,691 townships, 14,741 school districts, and 29,487 special districts. See VINCENT OSTROM 
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Five hundred thirty-five Members of Congress simply lack the time, 
attention span, or incentive to consider the details of how local gov­
ernments (or other nonfederal institutions) ought to be designed 
and controlled. 
To appreciate how daunting this task of supervising local gov­
ernments can be, consider a simple hypothetical federal law that 
dissects the state. Suppose that Congress were to enact a federal 
statute authorizing "home-rule municipalities" to adopt and en­
force antidiscrimination ordinances prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation. This hypothetical federal law dis­
sects the state by expressly preempting any state law or state consti­
tutional doctrines that interferes with municipalities' adoption of 
such ordinances. 
Congress reasonably cannot be expected to consider adequately 
the difficult questions of institutional design that such a hypotheti­
cal law would present. Whether a home-rule municipality ought to 
enact laws regulating employment will depend critically, for in­
stance, on how easily home-rule municipalities can be incorporated 
or chartered and how easily they can annex land. In states where 
such incorporation and annexation is largely controlled by local res­
idents, one tends to see dozens - perhaps hundreds - of munici­
palities crammed cheek by jowl into a single metropolitan area, 
each governing a small population and tiny fragment of territory.63 
This promiscuous creation of local governments might be perfectly 
sensible if there is some institution with greater geographic jurisdic­
tion that has the time and incentives to monitor the local govern­
ments' regulations to ensure that the municipalities do not impose 
external costs on each other. Under normal circumstances, this in­
stitution would be the state legislature. Our hypothetical federal 
statute, however, preempts such state legislative control over a cat­
egory of local ordinances. Unless Congress has time and incentives 
to perform the state legislature's supervisory function, there is a sig­
nificant likelihood that the local governments will run amok with 
their new federal powers. Some municipalities will use their federal 
authority to overregulate (because they can export the costs of their 
antidiscrimination laws to neighboring jurisdictions where the em­
ployers' main offices are located), while others will underregulate 
ET AL., LocAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1988) (citing 1987 CENSUS Govrs. 
prelim. rep., a t  1). 
63. For a recent study of (and attack on) the "fragmentation" of metropolitan areas into 
large numbers of competing municipalities, see DAVID RusK, CmES WITiiOUT SUBURBS 34 
(1993). For a more favorable assessment of such fragmentation, see generally MARK 
SCHNEIDER, THE CoMPETITIVE CITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUBURBIA (1989). 
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(because the employees who would be protected by such laws are 
nonvoting commuters). In short, Congress's delegation of power to 
local governments could result in regulatory incoherence, simply 
because local governments are not well-designed for the federal du­
ties that have been bestowed on them. 
Congress can avoid this danger of mismatching federal duties to 
local structure only by carefully considering how local governments 
are created, enlarged, and supervised in each state whenever it be­
stows federal authority on local governments. But it is inconceiv­
able that Congress could give sufficient attention to such minutiae 
of state-local relations, given that different states have radically dif­
ferent laws64 and political cultures65 that affect state-local relations. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that individual members of Congress, rep­
resenting districts of roughly 600,000 people, will have the same 
electoral incentive to consider small-scale intrastate externalities as 
do state legislators, who represent an average of 50,000 persons (as 
low as 2,900 persons in New Hampshire).66 Fifteen thousand state 
elected officials simply have greater capacity to consider the mun­
dane arcana of interlocal bickering than do 535 congresspersons 
burdened by a plethora of other issues. 67 
64. For some recent surveys of state-local legal relations in different states, see PoLmcs 
IN THE .AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 60-70 (Virginia Gray & Herbert 
Jacob eds., 6th ed. 1996); A DECADE OF DEVOLUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON STATE-LoCAL RE. 
LATIONS (E. Blaine Liner ed., 1989). 
65. According to Daniel Elazar, different states and regions have different political cul­
tures, meaning different attitudes toward government, the marketplace, democratic control, 
and bureaucracy. Elazar characterizes these cultures as "traditionalistic," "individualistic," 
or "moralistic." See DANIEL ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE VIEW FROM THE 
STATES 110-31 (3d ed. 1984). "Moralistic" cultures tend to believe that the government 
serves the public welfare; that professionalized bureaucracies ought to deliver public services; 
that citizens ought to participate widely in political deliberation; and that such debate should 
be based on the issues rather than partisan affiliation. By contrast, "individualistic" cultures 
tend to distrust government, regard politics as "dirty," and wish to limit governmental activ­
ity to regulation of imperfections in the marketplace. Massachusetts tends toward "moralis­
tic" politics, whereas Arizona tends toward an "individualistic" political culture. See id. at 
124-25. Subsequent research confirms that different political cultures create different voter 
attitudes toward government and different networks of political connections even between 
otherwise geographically, ethnically, culturally, and socially similar municipalities. See 
Arthur R. Stevens, State Boundaries and Political Cultures: An Exploration in the Tri-State 
Area of Michigan, Indiana and Ohio, PUBuus, Wmter 1974, at 111. For more recent litera­
ture exploring Elazar's "subculture" thesis, see generally Symposium, State Political Subcul­
tures: Further Research, PUBLros, Spring 1991, at 1. 
These political cultures can affect the degree to which a state supervises local governmen­
tal activity. See ELAZAR, supra, at 219-20. "Moralistic" political cultures in Massachusetts, 
for instance, tend to encourage localism. "Traditionalistic" regimes in the Southeast tend to 
discourage such autonomy. See id. at 118. 
66. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Constituents per State Legislative Dis­
trict (visited Feb. 13, 1999) <http://www.ncsl.org/programsnegman/elect/cnstprst.htm>. 
67. Of course, Congress could theoretically create its own regionally elected agents -
what one might call federal prefects - to supervise the actions of federal field offices. But 
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Second, the diversity of constituencies within the United States 
and their conflicts at the national level prevent national agencies 
from taking clear and decisive actions to supervise field offices or 
other local structures.68 Political polarization at the national level 
prevents any consensus about enforcement from developing in the 
national legislature, leaving field offices free to pursue their own 
agendas.69 By contrast, state and local politicians govern smaller, 
more homogeneous populations and therefore face fewer problems 
of polarization in supervising federal field offices within their juris­
diction. The evidence suggests that they use their influence aggres­
sively to affect field office operations.10 
Finally, Congress, unlike state legislatures, is relatively invulner­
able to the pressures of intergovernmental competition, pressures 
that may give elected representatives an additional incentive to 
monitor and reduce inefficient implementation of policy by bureau­
crats. According to the hypothesis first posed by Charles Tiebout's 
landmark article and subsequently developed by voluminous theo­
retical and empirical literature, to the extent that residents can 
freely enter and exit governmental jurisdictions, governments have 
an incentive to behave like firms in supplying local public goods: 
they compete with each other for residents and their tax dollars.71 
Congress historically has been reluctant to delegate broad policymaking discretion to elected 
officers, in part because members of Congress like to take credit for performing casework for 
their constituents and jealously guard this prerogative from rival politicians. Several com­
mentators have noted that Congress has been reluctant to bestow unrestricted revenue on 
state and local politicians because such revenue sharing would enable state and local politi­
cians to take credit for federal policies, eliminating opportunities for ribbon-cutting and other 
visible credit-taking by Congress. See, e.g., CoNLAN, supra note 12, at 37-38, 41-43 (noting 
reluctance of Congress to yield control of categorical programs because such grants are "the 
porkiest of pork" for which Congress can claim credit at election time, and arguing that 
"block grants pose a threat to the self-interests of congressmen . . .  because they diminish 
opportunities for advertising, credit claiming, and casework"); MoRRis P. FIORINA, CoN­
GRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON EsTABLISHMENT 73-74 (2d ed. 1989); HAIDER, 
supra note 56, at 66.(describing reluctance of Congress to enact a revenue-sharing plan and 
to provide open-ended grants of revenue to its "rivals and adversaries"); DAVID R. 
MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 128-29 (1974). 
68. See John T. Scholz et al., Street-Level Political Controls Over Federal Bureaucracy, 85 
AM. Por.. Sci. REv. 829, 833-34 (1991). 
69. See DERTiilCK, supra note 21, at 196 (noting that political conflict prevents federal 
governmentfrom aggressively pursuing policies); RICHARD F. FENNo, JR., CoNGRESSMEN IN 
COMMITTEES 77 (1973) (describing partisan conflict on Congressional Education and Labor 
Committees). For a popular account of the propensity of the federal government toward 
gridlock, see JONATHAN RAuCH, DEMOSCLERos1s: THE SILENT KILLER OF AMERICAN Gov­
ERNMENT (1994). . 
70. See Scholz et al., supra note 68, at 842-48; B. Dan Wood, Modeling Federal Imple­
mentation as a System: The Clean Air Case, 36 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 40, 56-59 (1992). 
71. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Por.. EcoN. 416 
(1956). For a nicely written summary of recent literature in layperson's terms, see WILLIAM 
A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAw, EcoNOMics, AND PoLITics 254-69 (1995). For a 
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Empirical literature suggests that such competition constrains the 
size of urban bureaucracies.72 Other literature suggests that the ab­
sence of intergovernmental competition resulting from centraliza­
tion of functions in the federal government increases the size of the 
federal bureaucracy implementing the function.73 In short, state 
legislators might run a leaner, more efficient operation because in­
tergovernmental competition makes them more tax-conscious than 
Congress. 
All of these considerations suggest that Congress is unlikely to 
be the best institution for allocating power among nonfederal gov­
ernmental institutions for the purpose of promoting local self­
governance. The italicized phrase suggests an important caveat: the 
structural characteristics listed above - a high ratio of elected-to­
appointed politicians, homogeneous populations, and intergovern­
mental competition - are beneficial only if one's goal is the cost­
effective delivery of local public goods. If one has other goals in 
mind, then these characteristics can be harmful, not beneficial. So, 
for instance, if one's goal is redistribution of wealth to low-income 
households, interjurisdictional competition for tax base will likely 
impede this goal. Likewise, if one's goal is to provide benefits to 
persons residing outside a municipality - say, interstate transit -
then the dominance of the municipality by elected officials who are 
highly responsive to local residents will hardly ensure accomplish­
ment of one's goal. To the contrary, one would expect the local 
officials to divert federal money away from the goal of benefiting 
nonresidents. Thus, the very facts that make state and local govern­
ments so efficient and politically responsive for the provision of lo­
cal public goods - a high ratio of elected officials to constituents, 
low monitoring costs, and high levels of intergovernmental compe­
tition - also give such governments an incentive to undermine the 
accomplishment of federal goals when they are assigned federal re-
more detailed analysis and empirical confirmation of this neo-Tiebout position, see MARK 
SCHNEIDER ET AL., PUBuc ENTREPRENEURS! AGENTS FOR CHANGE IN AMERICAN GOVERN· 
MENT (1995), and SCHNEIDER, supra note 63. 
72. See ROBERT M. STEIN, URBAN ALTERNATIVES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MARKETS IN 
THE PROVISION oF LoCAL SERVICES (1990); Mark Schneider, Intermunicipal Competition, 
Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrats, and the Level of Suburban Competition, 33 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 
612 (1989). For a debate about whether evidence for such competition exists, see Albert 
Breton, The Existence and Stability of Interjurisdictional Competition in COMPETITION 
AMoNG STA'IES AND LoCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EouITY IN AMERICAN FED· 
ERALISM 37-63 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991), and John E. Chubb, How 
Relevant Is Competition to Government Policymaking?, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES 
AND LoCAL GOVERNMENTS, supra, at 37-63. 
73. See, e.g., David Joulfaian & Michael L. Marlow, Centralization and Government Com­
petition, 23 APPLIED EcoN. 1603 {1991). 
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sponsibilities. But, to the extent that one is interested in creating 
institutions for local self-governance, one can plausibly argue that 
state governments are better suited for designing institutions to ac­
complish this goal than the federal government. 
One might respond that this comparative advantage of state 
governments provides no policy justification for the principle of 
state supremacy. After all, why should we adopt constitutional 
principles that promote state goals of local self-governance at the 
expense of rival national goals? But there are three reasons why, 
when one is dealing with nonfederal institutions, one should give 
paramount weight to the pursuit of local self-governance. 
First and most obviously, the primary goal of nonfederal institu­
tions is, well, nonfederal. The raison d'etre of these institutions is 
local self-governance, not delivery of national programs. To be 
sure, they have an important secondary role in delivering various 
nationally funded goods ranging from unemployment insurance to 
assistance for needy families. But these are still their secondary 
purposes: the bulk of nonfederal institutions' revenue - seventy to 
eighty percent, depending on the state - is not derived from fed­
eral grants, and the bulk of their duties have nothing to do with 
delivery of nationally mandated services.74 It would be odd to give 
Congress the power to liberate nonfederal institutions from the 
control of state legislatures when state legislatures are better suited 
for defining those institutions' primary purpose. 
Second, one can safely assume that nonfederal institutions' suit­
ability for local self-governance remains important even when they 
are carrying out federal law. After all, if the purpose of a national 
program did not require local self-governance (that is, the delivery 
of local public goods to the local population), then there would be 
no reason to use nonfederal institutions to implement the program: 
instead, Congress would be well-advised to create a purely federal 
agency to implement the national program. Congress does not 
delegate to state or local governments the responsibility to create or 
supervise the Foreign Service or the Marines because diplomacy 
and national defense are pure national services, the benefits of 
which are intended to be spread evenly throughout the nation. By 
contrast, when the national government declines to create a purely 
national bureaucracy, it is a safe bet that there is some aspect of the 
74. Federal grants constituted 26.5% of state-local outlays in 1978. Between 1978 and 
1987, federal grants declined precipitously to only 18.2% of state-local outlays. See TIMOTHY 
CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TwENTY-FIVE YEARS OF lNraRGOV­
ERNMENTAL REFORM 148 (1998). 
1224 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 97:1201 
national program requiring institutions that are good at local self­
governance. Therefore, even if one regards national policymaking 
as paramount, one might want to adopt constitutional doctrines 
under which the peculiar advantages of nonfederal institutions for 
local self-governance would be preserved. 
Third and most important, it is plausible to believe that any fed­
eral interest in altering nonfederal institutions' structure to serve 
national goals can be accommodated through Congress's power to 
induce state cooperation with federal grants-in-aid: Congress ar­
guably needs no further power to dissect the state. In section I.C, I 
will offer an important qualification to this assertion. For now, 
however, consider why voluntary intergovernmental bargains might 
be the best way to balance the relative weight of national goals 
against local self-governance. Congress can induce state govern­
ments to waive what I call "state supremacy" and alter their struc­
ture by offering federal revenue to state governments.75 One might 
argue that the states' willingness to accept or reject such federal 
revenue provides an accurate measure of whether nonfederal insti­
tutions should be used for local self-governance or other rival na­
tional goals. The revenue proffered by the federal government, 
after all, might be regarded as a reasonably reliable measure of how 
much the federal government really values the assistance of 
nonfederal governments. If state governments decline to alter the 
structure of their government and thereby forgo these federal 
grants, this is a good sign that the state people (represented by the 
state legislature) value local self-governance more than the national 
people (represented by Congress) value pursuit of national goals.76 
Federal unwillingness to pay the states' asking price suggests that 
the national government really did not value nonfederal assistance 
enough to justify intrusion into state structure.77 One might infer 
that, whenever the federal government cannot get states to cooper­
ate With bribes of federal revenue, then the federal government 
should not use nonfederal structures at all: instead, the federal gov-
75. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Commn., 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947) 
(requiring Oklahoma to forgo federal grant revenue if it refused to comply with federal de­
mands that state officials be governed by merit system). 
76. See Hills, supra note 2, at 871-93. Contrary to the popular myth that state officials 
cannot say "no" to federal money, there is considerable evidence that nonfederal officials 
carefully compare the costs and benefits of federal grants, declining grants where the costs of 
the conditions outweigh the value of the money. See WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 91; Hills, 
supra note 2, at 858-65; Helen Ingram, Policy Implementation Through Bargaining: The Case 
of Federal Grants-in-Aid, 25 PUB. PoL. 499 (1977). 
77. See Hills, supra note 2, at 872-75. 
March 1999] Dissecting the State 1225 
ernment should provide the service in-house with purely federal bu­
reaucrats and avoid erosion of local self-govemance.78 
In short, the principle of state supremacy ensures that deci­
sionmakers most capable of designing and monitoring nonfederal 
governmental institutions retain control of such institutions unless 
the federal government compensates those decisionmakers for such 
loss of control. This is a logical rule, and, although judicial prece­
dent provides no sensible explanation for it, both Congress and the 
Court have consistently respected it.79 
C. The Case Against State Supremacy: State Centralization and 
Strategic Behavior in (not so) Cooperative Federalism 
There is an undefended assumption in the defense of state 
supremacy provided in section I.B above. I assume that if the fed­
eral government wants state governments to alter their structure, 
then the federal government can simply bribe the states to do so, 
without any fear that transaction costs will impede the proposed 
intergovernmental bargains.80 But this assumption of no transac­
tion costs is false, and the falseness of this assumption suggests how 
the principle of state supremacy might be a potentially dangerous 
threat to cooperative federalism. 
78. One might compare this federal decision to forgo cooperative federalism in the face 
of recalcitrant states to the decision of a firm to use vertically integrated divisions rather than 
incur the additional costs of monitoring independent contractors that are likely to be faithless 
agents. For an analysis of how the costs of multiple contracts and agency costs might drive a 
firm to produce goods and services "in-house" rather than through contract with other firms, 
see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKE.TS AND HIERARCHIES: .ANALYSIS AND ANrrrausr IM­
PLICATIONS (1975). 
79. One might respond to these arguments by arguing that state creation of local govern­
ments need not entail state supremacy over those governments after they are created. Even 
if one assumes that state governments initially ought to create local governments, one might 
argue that the federal government could still use such state-created localities to carry out 
federal programs, preempting any state laws that interfered with such federal duties. This 
response, however, assumes that the federal government can somehow preserve the structure 
of local governments while delegating duties to them that are inconsistent with state law. But 
a moment's consideration suggests that this is an implausible position: the jurisdictional lim­
its on local governments are a crucial part of their structure, and federal delegation of powers 
to local governments would necessarily interfere with the structure of local government. For 
instance, a school district would be structurally a different entity altogether if its jurisdiction 
were enlarged to cover, say, land-use regulation: limiting school districts to educational mat­
ters was a deliberate structural decision designed to limit the role of partisan politics in 
school matters. 
80. "Transaction costs" loosely refers to the cost of striking bargains to transfer an enti­
tlement. In the context of this article, the relevant transactions are the intergovernmental 
agreements whereby states and local governments agree to implement federal policy in re­
turn for federal revenue. I include in the term "transaction costs" the costs of strategic mis­
representation of beliefs, preferences, willingness to abide by an agreement, etc. See Avery 
Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract 
Formation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 215, 225 (1990). 
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Intergovernmental bargaining is like any other bargaining: it is 
costly. In particular, as explained below, both federal and 
nonfederal officials frequently try to deceive each other about their 
available resources, need for assistance, willingness to terminate in­
tergovernmental programs, and likelihood of future noncompli­
ance. One can conveniently divide such strategic deception into 
two categories.81 
First, there is the deception that can occur during the lobbying 
process by which Congress first creates grant programs. So, for in­
stance, intergovernmental lobbying organizations may exaggerate 
the costs to nonfederal governments of complying with conditions 
on federal funds in an effort to obtain fewer conditions or more 
revenue. In this respect, state and local officials engaging in "tin­
cup federalism" behave exactly like budget-maximizing federal 
agencies that submit oversize budget requests to the Office of Man­
agement and Budget or to Congress: in either case, the descriptions 
of the cost of implementing federal programs might be colored by 
the implementers' desire to receive as large an appropriation as 
possible.82 Unfortunately, Congress might lack an independent 
source of information with which to correct distorted budget re­
quests by either federal agencies or state and local governments. 83 
Second, deception can occur in the process of enforcing the 
grant program after specific states have accepted federal funds. It is 
a familiar point that state and local officials frequently act as faith­
less agents of the federal government, violating conditions attached 
to federal funds whenever the federal government fails to monitor 
their compliance.84 Moreover, the federal government cannot per­
fectly monitor its nonfederal agents, because monitoring is expen­
sive. The federal government cannot easily measure outputs 
produced by federal programs, because such outputs (healthy or 
well-educated children, safer streets, accurate yet timely adjudica-
81. By "strategic deception," I mean the withholding of information by a bargaining 
party in order to increase his or her share of the gains from trade at the expense of the other 
parties to a bargain. See A. MITCHELL PoLINsKY, AN lNTRoDucnoN To LAW AND EcoNoM­
ICS 18 (1983). 
82. For the standard description and analysis of such bureaucratic behavior, see WILLIAM 
A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971). 
83. Cf. Robert D. Putnam, The Political Attitude of Senior Civil Servants in Western 
Europe: A Preliminary Report, 3 BRIT. J. PoL. SCI. 257, 257-60 (1973). 
84. See, e.g., Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Stan· 
dards in Grant-In-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REv. 
600 (1972) (describing instances of state failure to abide by federal rules in administering 
AFDC program). 
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tion of benefits claims) are difficult to measure.ss But close federal 
supervision of inputs can destroy the flexibility in program imple­
mentation that presumably was the reason for using nonfederal 
governments in the first place.86 Even if the federal government 
could carefully monitor the actions of nonfederal agencies to detect 
when the agencies are violating congressional intent, it is difficult 
for Congress to correct those violations through ex post amend­
ments of the original legislation: the original coalition of interests 
that enacted some intergovernmental arrangement might not be 
able to muster the votes to change the new status quo established 
by the nonfederal governments' actions.s7 
The absence of effective remedies for breach of intergovern­
mental agreements can lead the federal and nonfederal govern­
ments to engage in a wasteful game of bluffing.ss The federal 
government's ultimate sanction is to withdraw the grant and termi­
nate a nonfederal government's involvement in the program. If, 
however, the federal agency's personnel were hired on the assump­
tion that the street-level implementation of the program would be 
provided by a nonfederal agency, then the federal government 
might have extremely limited capacity to replace the services pro­
vided by nonfederal governments with federally provided serv­
ices. s9 Therefore, the sanction of withdrawing federal funds from 
noncomplying state or local officials is usually too drastic for the 
federal government to use with any frequency: withdrawal of funds 
85. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND 
WHY THEY Do IT 165-68, 175, 247-51 (1989) (explaining constraints on congressional control 
of "craft agencies" and "procedural agencies" where agency outputs are difficult to measure 
or agency activities are highly technical and therefore invisible to outsiders). 
86. So, for instance, the federal government might insist that school districts avoid the 
commingling of federal funds for special education with ordinary state and local education 
funds in order to prevent the former from being converted to purposes other than aid to the 
handicapped. Unfortunately, rigorous separation of such funds can undermine the purpose 
of educating disabled children, by placing them in classes that are physically separate from 
other students. 
87. Cf. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Admin­
istrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 435-40 
(1989) (explaining how, "[b]y establishing a new status quo, a noncomplying agency has bro­
ken apart the coalition that gave rise to its initial mandate" and has prevented ex post sanc­
tions of agency misbehavior even if the legislature can perfectly monitor agency 
noncompliance). 
88. See BARDACH, supra note 57, at 224 (stating that intergovernmental negotiations 
about the shape of cooperative programs can be impeded by parties' awareness that "they 
will find it difficult if not impossible to enforce the terms of any agreement they reach once 
resources are committed and the program is under way"). 
89. See Michael J. Scicchitano & David M. Hedge, From Coercion to Partnership in Fed­
eral Partial Pre-emption: SMCRA, RCRA, and OSH Act, PtraLrus, Fall 1993 at 107, 114 
(noting that "revoking state primacy" in the enforcement of federal regulations "is an empty 
threat" because "federal agencies lack the personnel" to carry out the law directly). 
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will injure the very clients that the federal government wishes to 
serve.90 
Lacking a real capacity to terminate funding to punish noncom­
plying states, the federal agency might instead feign such a capacity, 
threatening to terminate funds unless noncompliance is remedied, 
in hopes that the nonfederal policymakers are ignorant of the fed­
eral agency's real inability to do so.91 Since state and local legisla­
tors are frequently ill-informed about the workings of federal 
agencies, they might be deceived by the federal agency's threats and 
comply with the federal agency's demands out of a mistaken fear 
that the agency will actually terminate federal funding.92 On the 
other hand, the nonfederal policymakers might simply match one 
deception with another: they might feign willingness to turn down 
the federal money and thereby dissuade the federal agency from 
enforcing the condition.93 In short, intergovernmental programs 
may be afflicted with pervasive and costly gamesmanship - strate­
gic deception that leads to delay and waste both when the programs 
are initially designed and enacted by Congress and when they are 
implemented by the states. 
Nevertheless, the system of intergovernmental relations shows 
remarkable persistence and effectiveness despite these obstacles. 
As I have argued elsewhere, one reason for such success is that the 
existence of intergovernmental competition among nonfederal in­
stitutions substantially reduces the dangers of strategic behavior.94 
90. William Janklow, governor of South Dakota between 1979 and 1987, notoriously ex­
ploited the federal government's inability to enforce its AFDC regulations against noncom­
plying states. As he candidly observed, "[i]t took me about four years to figure out that I 
could really ignore a lot of the federal rules and wouldn't have to face the sanctions . • . •  
Frankly, I just started ignoring all the federal rules and it made a remarkable difference in 
our ability to do things." MARsHALL KAPLAN & SUE O'BRIEN, THE GOVERNORS AND THE 
NEW FEDERALISM 47 (1991). 
91. See DERTiilCK, supra note 21, at 115-18. 
92. See DERTiilCK, supra note 21, at 210-11 (describing Massachusetts legislature's inabil­
ity to gauge whether the Social Security Administration would actually carry out its threat to 
withdraw federal funds in case of state noncompliance). 
93. In administering the Federal Emergency Relief Act, Harry Hopkins was repeatedly 
confronted by governors who refused to provide state matching funds after receiving federal 
grants requiring a state match, knowing that Hopkins would be reluctant to cut off aid to the 
unemployed. See JAMES T. PATIERSON, THE NEw DEAL AND THE STATES: FEDERALISM IN 
TRANsmoN 136-37 (describing Eugene Talmadge's refusal to appropriate state matching 
funds and daring federal officials to cut off federal money); CHARLES H. TROUT, BoSToN, 
THE GREAT DEPRESSION, AND THE NEW DEAL 158-62, 309-10 (1977) (describing Boston 
Democratic machine's tendency to ignore Hopkins's threats to cut off federal relief money if 
federal conditions were not obeyed). As Hopkins complained, in such federal-state conflicts, 
"who gets licked? The unemployed. They always get licked." PATIERSON, supra, at 72. 
94. See Hills, supra note 2, at 875-86. Eugene Bardach makes a similar point in 
BARDACH, supra note 57, at 98-100. 
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Under ordinary circumstances, various nonfederal governments 
with overlapping territorial jurisdiction - municipalities, counties, 
state agencies, etc. - compete with each other for control of fed­
eral grants-in-aid. If any nonfederal institution exaggerates the 
costs of implementing federal law, then other competing nonfederal 
institutions stand ready to provide a rival cost estimate and sup­
plant the strategic institution as the recipient of federal funds.95 
Moreover, nonfederal governments also monitor rival nonfederal 
governments' compliance with federal grant conditions after 
nonfederal governments receive federal grants, reporting noncom­
pliance to Congress in hopes that such noncompliance will persuade 
Congress to reallocate implementing authority and federal revenue 
to the monitoring nonfederal institution.96 In short, the dissection 
of "the state" into competing institutions with overlapping territo­
rial jurisdictions might play an important role in allowing the inter­
governmental system to function free from strategic behavior. 
But these considerations also suggest why the principle of state 
supremacy might be a threat to intergovernmental bargains: in the­
ory, the principle of state supremacy gives the state government a 
monopoly over all nonfederal governmental institutions.97 If the 
federal government cannot dissect the state by granting powers to 
any state subdivision or agency that are denied by state law, then 
there is a danger that the state legislature will simply swallow the 
competition. This worry about the state government's monopoliza­
tion of nonfederal institutions is not merely academic. State gov­
ernments become increasingly centralized as they assume greater 
responsibility for service delivery and financing of local govern­
ments' operations.98 Why this trend toward state centralization? 
One theory maintains that, like their federal counterparts, state pol­
iticians have little interest in increasing the wealth or power of rival 
politicians. Rather, they have an incentive to maximize their own 
opportunities for patronage and constituent service by depriving lo-
95. So, for instance, Donald Haider reports that the National Governors' Association 
sponsored studies showing that state governments were just as capable of administering the 
Safe Streets program as municipalities. See HAIDER, supra note 56, at 248. 
96. For instance, the National Conference of Mayors eventually persuaded Congress to 
end governors' control of funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration by 
insisting that governors' use of such funds be carefully monitored. See HAIDER, supra note 
56, at 206-07. 
97. Of course, state governments might still compete with each other for federal revenue; 
however, because state governments do not have overlapping territorial jurisdiction, each 
state would have a monopoly over nonfederal governmental resources within its territory. 
98. See G. Ross Stephens, State Centralization and the Erosion of Local Autonomy, 36 J. 
Por.. 44 (1974); Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Paths of Fiscal Centralization in the American States, 13 
POLY. STUD. J. 653 (1985). 
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cal politicians of discretionary control over policymaking and local 
budgets.99 
But, whatever its cause, state centralization makes federal use of 
nonfederal institutions more difficult. As Deil Wright has ob­
served, this trend "increas[ es the] difficulty of any national govern­
ment efforts to target or channel funds to local governments for 
purposes that are independent of, or contrary to, state policies."loo 
So, for instance, if the state legislature barred any municipality from 
applying directly for federal aid, such a measure would have a sig­
nificant effect on the federal government's ability to use cities as 
competitors against the states. Congress might still enact "pass­
through" grants to state legislatures, but the state legislatures might 
impose significant conditions on such funds, limiting Congress's 
ability to harness the policymaking capacity of localities.101 Like­
wise, if state legislatures reduced state aid to municipalities by pre­
cisely the amount of the federal grants that such cities received, the 
state legislature might also effectively bar Congress from using mu­
nicipalities as contractors for federal purposes. In effect, the state's 
vertical integration would eliminate Congress's access to whole cat­
egories of nonfederal institutions. 
II. THE PRESUMPTION OF INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY: 
PROMOTING INTER- AND !NTRAGOVERNMENTAL 
COMPETITION THROUGH LIMITS ON STATE 
GOVERNMENTS' POWER OVER 
FEDERAL GRANT REVENUE 
The arguments in Part I leave the constitutional lawyer facing a 
dilemma. If one insists on the principle of state supremacy, then 
one may promote local self-governance, but only at the expense of 
99. See PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 73-75 (1995). The history of 
state-local relations during the nineteenth century reflects some of these incentives. State 
legislatures were notorious during the nineteenth century for using "ripper" legislation to 
strip local governments of control over local administrative posts in order to maximize their 
ability to distribute jobs to political supporters. The wave of state constitutional amendments 
prohibiting "special legislation" or protecting "home rule" were ratified in response to this 
tendency. See David 0. Porter, The Ripper Clause in State Constitutional Law: An Early 
Urban Experiment - Part I, 1969 UTAH L. REv. 287, 299-306. More recently, state govern­
ments have exhibited a tendency to impose mandates on local governments that seem to 
confirm Peterson's analysis of state political incentives. See ADVISORY CoMMN. ON INTER· 
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT M-173, MANDATES: CASES IN STATE-LoCAL RELA· 
TIONS 14 (1990); CoNLAN, supra note 74, 259-60. 
100. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 319. 
101. The evidence from state administration of the Small Cities Block grant program sug­
gests that state governments would "re-categorize" federal monies to be passed through to 
localities by attaching elaborate state-law conditions to such funds. See RICH, supra note 59, 
at 119. ' 
March 1999] Dissecting the State 1231 
cooperative federalism. On the other hand, if · one simply gives 
Congress unlimited power to dissect the state, then one might en­
danger the usefulness of nonfederal institutions for local self­
governance. In short, precedent and policy do not provide certain 
guidance about the proper role of the state and federal 
governments. 
There are two conventional solutions to this dilemma. First, one 
might simply assume that members of Congress will have adequate 
electoral incentives to promote effective local self-governance in or­
der to win the approval of their constituents. Relying on this as­
sumption, one might give Congress an unlimited power to liberate 
state and local officers from the constraints of state law, confident 
that Congress will exercise prudent discretion in their use of this 
power. Second, if one has less confidence in the national political 
process, then one might want to use some sort of a "plain state­
ment" rule to ensure that Congress adequately deliberated about 
the structure of state and local government. Under this approach, 
one might allow Congress to reallocate power among state or local 
officials, but only if Congress did so with a statute plainly and un­
equivocally calling for such a reallocation of power. 
Neither of these solutions, however, is entirely satisfactory. 
"Political process" theories of federalism seem to rest on heroic as­
sumptions about voters' level of information concerning govern­
ment structure.102 "Plain statement" rules might encourage more 
deliberation in Congress about the structure of state and local gov­
ernment. But such a device for encouraging deliberation seems cu­
riously unrelated to the institutional capacity of Congress. As 
noted in section LB, Congress simply lacks the time and incentives 
to deliberate carefully about local self-governance, which is, after 
all, the main purpose of nonfederal institutions. Why, then, try to 
force Congress to deliberate about the technical arcana - for ex­
ample, annexation, incorporation, local governments' subject-mat­
ter jurisdiction, and so forth - that Congress is patently unsuited to 
consider? 
102. Of course, voters may well feel irked by the inefficient delivery of governmental 
services. But it is hardly self-evident that voters will blame Congress for such inefficiencies. 
It is at least as likely that voters will simply blame the bureaucrats themselves for inefficien­
cies in service delivery, without asking how the overall structure of the agency set up by 
Congress contributes to the agency's shortcomings. Indeed, it has even been suggested that 
individual members of Congress can profit electorally from the ineptitude of governmental 
agencies: when bureaucrats bungle in service delivery, then incumbent congresspersons can 
win their constituents' gratitude by performing casework for constituents who are aggrieved 
by bureaucratic decisionmaking. See BRUCE CAIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL VoTE: CoNSTITU­
ENCY SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE 205-06 (1987). 
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In this Part of the article, I propose a third method for recon­
ciling the values of local self-governance and cooperative federal­
ism. I argue that the courts might solve this dilemma with a canon 
of construction that I call a "presumption of institutional auton­
omy." This presumption is simply a canon requiring courts to con­
strue ambiguous federal grant legislation and state laws to 
maximize the ability of nonfederal institutions to compete with 
each other for federal money. Under this presumption, state and 
local officers would be presumed to be authorized by state law to 
use federal grant dollars for a federally specified purpose unless the 
state legislature clearly and unequivocally has barred them from 
undertaking such federal responsibilities. 
The presumption of institutional autonomy is exactly the oppo­
site of the "plain statement" rule used to promote federalism in, 
say, Gregory v. Ashcroft. Rather than construe ambiguities in fed­
eral statutes to favor the interests or autonomy of the states, the 
presumption of institutional autonomy construes ambiguities in 
state law to help the federal government dissect the state. Put an­
other way, the federalism-promoting canon of construction in Greg­
ory helps protect federalism through the national political process 
in Congress. By contrast, the presumption of institutional auton­
omy defended here helps protect nationalism through the political 
processes of the states. As I shall explain below, the presumption 
allows the federal government to exploit competition between 
nonfederal institutions to reduce the risk that any nonfederal insti­
tution will be a faithless agent. By requiring a "plain statement" 
from the state legislatures before barring a nonfederal officer from 
bargaining with the federal government, the presumption helps en­
sure that state legislatures will not withhold access to nonfederal 
institutions for improper - that is, strategic - reasons. 
But, while Gregory's federalism-promoting canon of construc­
tion and the presumption of institutional autonomy are mirror 
images of each other, they both use the same approach to vindicat­
ing constitutional values. In both cases, courts might worry that 
they lack the capacity to resolve difficult empirical questions con­
cerning the utility of federalism or cooperative federalism. The the­
ory underlying both the Gregory canon and the presumption of 
institutional autonomy is that, by requiring well-informed political 
branches to act by a clear statement, the courts can strike the right 
balance between competing structural values. But, apart from 
these considerations of policy, I shall also argue that the presump­
tion of institutional autonomy makes sense as a matter of conven-
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tional legal reasoning (though here the case for the presumption is 
admittedly more ambiguous). In particular, the presumption helps 
promote understanding of some otherwise mystifying judicial 
opinions. 
A. Construing Federal Grant Conditions and Remedies to 
Promote Intergovernmental Competition 
Consider two sorts of ambiguities that might afflict a federal 
grant to a local government. First, the federal statute might be am­
biguous about whether the local recipient of the grant must have 
control over the money free from state oversight. This ambiguity 
raises a question of federal law - how to determine the substantive 
conditions attached to federal money. Second, assuming that the 
federal grant is interpreted to exclude state control of the federal­
local grant law, there might be ambiguities about the proper reme­
dies to use if the state government nevertheless attempts to dictate 
the use of the federal money. On one hand, the court might simply 
enjoin state laws that attempt to control the grant to the local gov­
ernment, allowing the local government to exercise exclusive con­
trol over the money. On the other hand, the court might simply 
declare the local government ineligible to apply for the federal 
money, implicitly finding that the state in which the local govern­
ment is located does not consent to the conditions in the federal 
grant. As I shall explain in more detail below, this question con­
cerning remedies is largely a question of state law: to resolve this 
issue, the court must decide whether a state government would 
rather waive its laws controlling the federal grant or instead cease 
to be eligible for federal money. 
I will argue in this section that, in a broad range of circum­
stances specified below, courts should resolve both sorts of ambigu­
ities in favor of local control over federal money: using what I call a 
"presumption of institutional autonomy," courts should construe 
the federal-local grant to exclude state control of the federal 
money. The proper remedy for state laws that violate local control 
ought to be injunction of the state laws rather than local ineligibility 
for the grant. Before I attempt to justify this view, I will define this 
position more carefully in section II.A.l, using the Supreme Court's 
decision in Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District103 
as an illustration. Then, in section II.A.2, I will provide a justifica-
103. 469 U.S. 256 {1985). 
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tion for the rule rooted in policy, precedent, and the structure of 
intergovernmental relations. 
1. Defining the Presumption of Institutional Autonomy in the 
Context of Federal-Local Grant Programs 
In Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District, Law­
rence County had received over $100,000 from the federal govern­
ment to provide compensation for the county's loss of tax revenue 
resulting from the existence of tax-exempt federal lands within the 
county's boundaries. The federal statute creating the grant pro­
gram stated that local governments would have discretion to spend 
such funds on "any governmental purpose." A South Dakota stat­
ute, however, required the county auditor to distribute both federal 
and state payments in lieu of taxes in the same ratio as the county's 
general tax revenues were allocated. Because the county distrib­
uted sixty percent of its general tax revenue to its school districts, 
this state statute effectively required sixty percent of the payment in 
lieu of taxes to be allocated to the school districts. The county ar­
gued that this state requirement violated the terms of the grant pro­
gram, because the federal government intended to provide the 
county with unfettered discretion to spend the federal grant on any 
purpose, free from state interference.104 
The Supreme Court agreed with the county, relying on the PI­
LOT statute's language allowing the county to spend the PILOT 
funds on "any government purpose."105 But this language resolves 
very little: it might simply mean that Congress wished to preclude 
federal limits on county activities, not that Congress intended to lib­
erate counties from state supervision. So the Court also relied on 
the legislative history of the PILOT statute. According to the 
Court, Congress had explicitly decided that PILOT funds should 
not "pass through" the state governments for the state governments 
to distribute to local governments. Instead, in light of the experi­
ence with state-county rivalries in the general revenue sharing pro­
gram, Congress had deliberately chosen to disburse the PILOT 
money directly to local governments without state intermediation. 
For the Court, this decision to bypass state governments entailed 
the conclusion that a state government also could not enact general 
legislation governing PILOT funds even after the county received 
such funds.106 
104. See Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 258-59. 
105. See Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 260. 
106. See Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 261-68. 
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It is important to see that Lawrence County involves two legal 
ambiguities, only one of which the Court addresses. First, there is 
the federal statutory ambiguity - the issue of whether the federal 
PILOT statute bars the state legislature from interfering with 
Lawrence County's discretion to allocate the PILOT grant. Second, 
there is a further ambiguity that the Court ignores - the ambiguity 
in the remedy that ought to be granted for South Dakota's violation 
of the conditions of the grant program. 
Even though the Court addresses the first issue, its resolution of 
the issue of statutory construction is unsatisfying. As Justice 
Rehnquist Goined by Justice Stevens) noted in dissent, "the system 
of laws that regulates [county] activities" presupposes that counties 
can be altered or destroyed entirely by their parent state govem­
ment.107 While this rule might not constrain Congress's powers, it 
seems odd to construe the PILO T grant as " somehow 
emancipat[ing] the county from the state regimen as to what is and 
is not a proper governmental purpose for a county."108 Admittedly, 
the legislative history cited by the Court indicates that the cash was 
to be granted directly to the county and not to the state, and that 
Congress wished for the county to have the same discretion to 
spend the money as it would have to spend any other funds at its 
disposal, free from federal strings. It hardly follows, however, that 
Congress intended to displace the state legislatures' traditional pre­
rogative to define the powers and responsibilities of its counties. 
Indeed, if one took the majority's logic seriously, then Lawrence 
County should be permitted to use its federal PILOT grant to de­
fine and punish felonies, annex territory from neighboring local 
governments, create a militia, or modify the state's commercial 
code. True, state laws generally prohibit counties and other local 
governments from pursuing these ends.109 But, if it is true that the 
state cannot place limits on how the county should spend its federal 
PILOT funds, then it logically follows that no state-law limits on the 
powers of counties can be invoked to limit the county's discretion 
to spend its PILOT funds as it pleases. The problem with the 
Court's reasoning, in short, is that it ignores how the very definition 
107. See Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 256, 270-71. 
108. Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 272. 
109. Unlike municipalities and like cities, counties cannot annex land from neighboring 
local governments. See Briffault, supra note 37, at 361. Moreover, local governments gener­
ally do not obtain the power to define and provide for the punishment of felonies as a result 
of "home rule" powers. e.g., CoMM. ON HoME RuLE OF THE AMERICAN MUNICIPAL AssN., 
MODEL CoNSTL. PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HOME RULE § 6 (1953); NATIONAL MUNICI­
PAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CoNST. § 8.02 (rev. ed. 1968). 
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of a "county" presupposes a network of state laws that define and 
limit the purposes that counties can pursue. Of course, it is unlikely 
that the Court intended to invalidate all state-law limits on county 
power. But nothing in the reasoning of the Court explains why 
South Dakota's law allocating the county's federal PILOT funds 
differs from South Dakota's laws barring counties from annexing 
other counties, condemning the state house, or enacting a general 
criminal code. 
While the Lawrence County Court's resolution of the federal 
statutory question is unsatisfactory, the Court's attention to the re­
medial issue is nonexistent. The majority notes that, pursuant to its 
power to spend federal revenue, "Congress may impose conditions 
on the receipt of federal funds"110; it concludes from this proposi­
tion that any state law interfering with such conditions "runs afoul 
of the Supremacy Clause."111 But it is well-settled that Congress 
has the power to change a state government's structure by spending 
federal revenue only if the state government actually accepts the 
revenue and thereby "knowingly and voluntarily accepts the terms 
of the contract."112 By setting aside South Dakota's law because it 
was inconsistent with the conditions on the federal PILOT grant, 
the Court must therefore be assuming that South Dakota has some­
how knowingly and voluntarily waived (some of?) its state laws de­
fining county powers in order for its counties to continue to be 
eligible for federal PILOT grants. This implicit conclusion, how­
ever, is odd, given that South Dakota never repealed the law being 
challenged in the case and never applied for the federal grant, 
which was awarded directly to Lawrence County without the state 
government's intermediation. The Court never explains why the 
proper remedy in this case is not simply to find that, because South 
Dakota's laws do not comply with the conditions attached to the 
federal PILOT grant, Lawrence County is ineligible to participate 
in the PILOT program and must return its federal PILOT grant. 
My criticism of Lawrence County is not intended to suggest that 
the holding of the decision is incorrect: as I shall explain below, 
110. Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 269-70. 
111. Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 270. 
112. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("The legiti­
macy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the 
State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.' There can, of course, be 
no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is 
expected of it.'') (citations omitted); see also Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Commn., 330 U.S. 127, 
143-44 (1947); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937); Massachusetts v. 
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482-83 (1923). 
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there is a powerful case to be made that the case is rightly decided. 
The inadequacy of the Court's reasoning, however, requires one to 
look deeper for an explanation of the case. One explanation is that 
this case is an instance of extreme judicial nationalism that abro­
gates the principle of state supremacy. Under this reading, Law­
rence County might provide Congress with a right to use willing 
local governments as its agents even when state laws prohibit such a 
relationship and bar the local governments from accepting federal 
money.113 Such a reading would effectively eliminate the principle 
of state supremacy by enabling the federal government to "liber­
ate" nonfederal institutions from state law simply by bestowing un­
restricted federal funds upon them. As Professor Engdahl correctly 
notes, any such holding would be inconsistent with the reasoning of 
the entire Spending Clause jurisprudence, which has always as­
sumed that a state government must voluntarily accept a federal 
grant in order for the grant to create any state obligations.114 
Another explanation is that the county's voluntary acceptance 
of the grant constitutes acceptance by the state for the purposes of 
Pennhurst115 and other spending power decisions. But this reason­
ing would effectively allow one part of the state to bind the whole. 
In effect, such a reading of Lawrence County makes the concept of 
"consent" meaningless by allowing Congress to redefine which offi­
cial is entitled to "consent" to federal demands on behalf of the 
state. It is as if Congress purported to purchase a subsidiary owned 
by a private joint-stock corporation by obtaining the consent of the 
subsidiary's CEO (or, for that matter, its mailroom personnel or 
secretarial pool). If Congress can so freely define what it means for 
an institution to consent, then the concept of consent loses its justif­
icatory force. 
Rather than accept such radical reworkings of spending clause 
jurisprudence, I offer a more modest explanation for the result in 
the case. As explained below, one can reconcile Lawrence County 
with the more general spending power jurisprudence by viewing the 
decision as an instance in which the Court enforced the presump­
tion of institutional autonomy. 
To understand this presumption, it is necessary to distinguish 
between two different limits that state law might impose on state or 
113. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 74-76 (1994) (criticizing 
Lawrence County as implicitly assuming that Congress can use grants to enlarge powers of 
local government). 
114. See id. 
115. See supra note 112. 
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local officials. First, state law might prohibit certain types of activi­
ties because the states' lawmakers (by which I mean constitutional 
conventions as well as the state legislature) believe that the local 
government is unfit to pursue the activity, regardless of how the 
activity is funded. For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to these 
limits as "regulatory limits" on local discretion. So, for instance, a 
state's constitution might bar public school teachers from entering 
the physical premises of private parochial schools to provide those 
private schools' students with special educational services. Such a 
prohibition would apply regardless of how the teacher's services 
were :financed: the state simply regards such mixing of public 
school teachers and private religion as an undesirable mixing of 
church and state. Likewise, a state may refrain from bestowing the 
power to enact zoning ordinances on county governments in order 
to avoid excessive regulation of land use. Again, the source of the 
funds used by a county for zoning enforcement is irrelevant to this 
prohibition: the state prohibits all such activity regardless of how it 
is funded. 
One can usefully distinguish such regulatory prohibitions on lo­
cal governments' activities from a second type of limit on local dis­
cretion, in which the state lawmakers have no particular objection 
to any local activity but instead wish to redirect federal revenues so 
they are expended on activities favored by the state lawmakers. I 
shall refer to such limits as "revenue-enhancing" limits on local dis­
cretion, because their purpose is simply to enhance the state's fiscal 
condition. The classic example of "revenue-enhancing" state laws 
is the state offset rules reducing state aid to school districts by pre­
cisely the amount of federal "impact aid" that such school districts 
receive.116 These state offset rules do not identify any specific pol­
icy as inefficient or inappropriate: the school districts can still pur­
sue any policy they please - just with less federal money. The 
purpose of the state offset rules, therefore, is not the regulatory su­
pervision of local discretion but rather simply the state legislature's 
desire to confiscate federal grant revenue. 
Lawrence County presents a harder case. On one hand, one 
could argue that the state redirection of federal PILOT money was 
merely revenue-enhancing: nothing in the state law regulating 
county use of PILOTs suggested that there were substantive poli-
116. See Carlsbad Union Sch. Dist. v. Rafferty, 300 F. Supp. 434 (S.D. Cal. 1969); 
Hergenreter v. Hayden, 295 F. Supp. 251 (D. Kan. 1968); Triplett v. Tiemann, 302 F. Supp. 
1244 (D. Neb. 1969); Douglas lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Jorgenson, 293 F. Supp. 849 (D. S.D. 1968); 
Shepheard v. Godwin, 280 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Va. 1968). 
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cies with which counties could not be entrusted, for the state law 
did not bar counties from pursuing any policy with county revenue. 
On the other hand the state law did not single out federal grant 
revenue alone for state control: it applied to state PILOT revenue 
as well.117 One might, therefore, characterize the state law as a reg­
ulatory measure designed to constrain county discretion over all 
nonsource revenue. In general, one can distinguish between regula­
tory and revenue-enhancing limits on local governments' power 
with the following rule of thumb: if the state law limits local gov­
ernments' actions only to the extent that those actions are funded 
by federal grants and not otherwise, then the state law is a revenue­
enhancing measure. Otherwise, the state law is a regulatory 
measure. 
This distinction between regulatory and revenue-enhancing 
state laws defines the scope of the presumption of institutional au­
tonomy in the following ways. First, as a matter of construing fed­
eral grant legislation, when the federal government bestows federal 
revenues directly on local governments (for instance in the form of 
community development block grants, revenue sharing, impact aid, 
or payments in lieu of taxes); then courts should presume that, by 
bypassing the state legislature and bestowing federal revenue di­
rectly on the local government recognized by the state constitu­
tion, 118 Congress intended to exclude state legislatures from 
imposing revenue-enhancing limits on local discretion over federal 
funds. So, for instance, federal district courts were correct to disre­
gard state laws offsetting state aid by the amount of federal impact 
aid that such districts received. Likewise, although it is a closer 
case, the Lawrence County Court may have acted properly by 
presuming that Congress intended to bar the South Dakota legisla­
ture from redistributing sixty percent of the federal grant from the 
county to school districts, because South Dakota's law was a 
revenue-enhancing measure and the South Dakota Constitution 
recognized the county government as a constitutionally protected 
policymaking institution.119 Second, concerning remedies for viola­
tions of grant conditions, the presumption of institutional autonomy 
would presume that local governments should have standing to 
117. S.D. CooIFIED LAWS § 5-11-6 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1998). 
118. I explain the reason for limiting the presumption to constitutionally recognized local 
governments at infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text. 
119. See S.D. CoNST. art. IX, § 2 (authorizing counties to adopt home-rule charters). The 
constitutional recognition need not involve immunity from legislative action: it is sufficient 
that the state constitution simply create the institution and bestow powers on it that, absent 
state legislative action, can be exercised to initiate policies. 
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challenge such state-law limits and that courts should not simply 
declare the local government ineligible to receive federal funds but 
should instead enjoin the revenue-enhancing state law that inter­
feres with local discretion. Thus, Lawrence County correctly held 
that the revenue-enhancing state law reallocating the federal 
PILOT grant should simply be set aside. 
2. The Justification for the Presumption of Institutional 
Autonomy in the Context of Federal-Local Grants 
Why adopt such a construction of grant programs? The pre­
sumption can be defended in terms of policy, legislative context, 
and precedent, although the argument rooted in policy is the least 
ambiguous of the arguments. 
As argued in section I.B, the intergovernmental system benefits 
from intergovernmental competition between state and local gov­
ernments. The trend toward state centralization, however, reduces 
such competition, in part for such pernicious reasons as maximiza­
tion of state governments' patronage opportunities, prestige, 
budget, etc. The presumption in favor of institutional autonomy 
would counteract this trend by giving local governments greater 
control over federal grant revenue, free from state regulation that 
would redirect such revenue to projects chosen by the state legisla­
ture. By bestowing federal revenue on local governments, the fed­
eral government creates a constituency - local politicians and their 
intergovernmental organizations - with a vested interest in lobby­
ing to preserve control of such revenue. 
The system of federal grants, in other words, is not merely the 
effect of lobbying of various nonfederal governments and organiza­
tions: it is also a cause of such lobbying. Such federal revenue pays 
the salaries of local officials who then become a potent force to 
continue the program; it pays benefits to local constituents who also 
lobby for the continuation of the program.120 Federal-local grants 
120. See, e.g., THOMAS J. ANroN, AMERICAN FEDERALISM AND PuBLic POLICY: How 
TiiE SYSTEM WoRI<S 68-70 (1989) (describing how federal grants create local capacity for 
local governments to participate in intergovernmental system by improving their ability and 
incentive to apply for further federal aid); DERTHICK, supra note 21, at 56-58 (describing how 
a federal social security old-age program stimulated the creation of a lobby in Massachusetts 
to expand the program). For a recent example of this tendency, see Stephen Glass, Anatomy 
of a Policy Fraud: The Hollow Crime Bil� THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 17, 1997, at 22, 23-24 
(describing how federal grants for extra police gives municipalities an incentive to hire lobby­
ists to extend life of program). The multiplication of intergovernmental lobbies with an inter­
est in federal programs need not increase the total amount of intergovernmental aid. To the 
contrary, by dividing aid among several levels of nonfederal governments, Congress can en­
courage nonfederal governments to lobby against the other nonfederal institutions' access to 
aid. For instance, municipalities' efforts to redirect federal revenue sharing from state gov-
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thus give intergovernmental organizations and nonfederal officials 
a reason to focus their attention on Washington, D.C.121 So, for 
instance, the National Conference of Mayors arose in part because 
the Roosevelt administration offered federal aid directly to cities, 
giving big city mayors like Frank Murphy and Fiorello LaGuardia a 
political incentive to lobby in Washington.122 County commission­
ers who receive federal PILOT funds likewise have a greater incen­
tive to monitor congressional activities to ensure that they do not 
lose control of such funds. 
Why is it desirable to multiply the intergovernmental organiza­
tions interested in federal largesse? One hypothesis of this article is 
that such participation of different nonfederal institutions in the in­
tergovernmental lobbying game is a useful way to constrain any sin­
gle set of nonfederal institutions from acting strategically. As each 
category of nonfederal institutions develops a capacity to adminis­
ter federal programs and an interest in lobbying for control over 
federal revenues, Congress becomes less dependent on any single 
governmental entity for information about the costs of intergovern­
mental programs. If any single entity becomes recalcitrant, then 
Congress can redirect federal money to a different and more com­
pliant nonfederal institution. If this hypothesis is correct - and 
admittedly it must be taken as merely plausible absent rigorous em­
pirical confirmation - then grant systems that diffuse federal reve­
nue among competing nonfederal institutions might also plausibly 
cultivate the sort of intergovernmental competition that makes the 
system of cooperative federalism function most efficiently. 
One must be careful, however, to qualify this argument in favor 
of encouraging fragmentation of state institutions and subdivisions. 
There will obviously come some point at which the costs of frag­
mentation and intergovernmental competition will exceed their 
benefits. In particular, there is a danger that, if any state agency or 
field office could compete for federal revenue, then the state gov­
ernment's central supervising agencies - the governor or key legis­
lative committees - would be deprived of the capacity to engage in 
emments to themselves led them to be sharply critical of state management of such aid -
criticism which led to the termination of such aid for all nonfederal governments. See Ste­
phen Farber, Federalism and State-Local Relations, in A DECADE OF DEVOLUTION: PERSPEC. 
TIVES ON STATE-LoCAL RELATIONS, supra note 64, at 27, 39-40. 
121. See ADVISORY CoMMN. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT A-54, THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANT SYSTEM AS SEEN BY LoCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL OFFICIALS 
113 (1977) (noting that "the greater the agency's Federal aid dependency, the more contacts 
exist [between the state and federal agency]"). 
122. See MICHAEL I. GELFAND, THE NEW DEAL AND THE CmEs 23-70 (1975) (describing 
the founding of the National Conference of Mayors during the 1930s). 
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comprehensive budgeting.123 One might be confronted by the spec­
tacle of district attorneys, state agencies' field offices, subagencies, 
and even individual state officers applying for and receiving federal 
grants without any preclearance from the governor or state budget 
director. In theory, such individuals or agencies could then use the 
conditions in the federal grant legislation to prevent the requisite 
supervising agent or agency from asserting centralized control over 
the federally funded institution, eliminating the possibility of com­
prehensive budgeting by the only institutions capable of surveying 
all of the states' programs and establishing some sort of priority 
among them.124 
To avoid such a disintegration of the state into a bundle of unco­
ordinated bureaucratic fiefdoms, one must limit the scope of the 
presumption of institutional autonomy: not just any state or local 
official should be authorized to apply for federal grants and then 
use the conditions in the grant to liberate him- or herself from state 
control. The easiest rule might be to limit the presumption to state 
subdivisions or departments the existence of which is recognized by 
the state constitution - for instance, counties, townships, school 
districts, municipalities, and a few state executive agencies like state 
universities, the state fish and game commissions, and elected state 
officials such as the attorney general.125 As a practical matter, such 
a rule would ensure that the presumption applied only to those 
123. For examples of this worry, see ASSEMBLY WAYS & MEANs CoMM., NEw YoRK 
STATE LEGISLATURE, APPROPRIATING FEDERAL FUNDS: A PROPOSAL FOR NEW YORK 
STATE (Dec 6, 1976), reprinted in Role of State Legislatures in Appropriating Fed. Funds to 
States, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on 
GovtL Affairs, 95th Cong. 9-11 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings](describing instances in which 
highly specialized state agencies will liberate themselves from comprehensive budgeting 
through grant applicatiqns). 
124. For defenses of comprehensive budgeting as a way to promote express consideration 
of the relative merits of old and new programs, see AARoN WILDA VSKY, THE PoLmcs OF 
THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 136-37 (4th ed. 1984). For an example of a state law promoting 
comprehensive budgeting, see ALA. CODE §§ 41-19-1 to 41-19-12 (Michie Supp. 1994) (Ala­
bama Budget Management Act). At the federal level, comprehensive budgeting has been 
promoted by various statutes and legislative rules. For a review of these mechanisms, see 
Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. 
L. REv. 593 (1988). 
125. The number of executive offices created by the state constitution will tend to vary 
with the age of the constitution and political culture of the state. State constitutions that are 
older or derive from what Elazar calls "traditionalistic" or "individualistic" political cultures 
will tend to have numerous independent and elected state executive officials, reflecting popu­
list distrust of executive power. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. § 112-114 (creating eight elected state­
wide executive offices); ARK. CoNsT. art. VI, § 1 (creating seven elected state-wide offices). 
By contrast, constitutions that have been recently updated, especially in "moralistic" political 
cultures that are more trustful of vigorous governmental action, tend to create a unified exec­
utive branch with power concentrated in a single elected governor assisted by a lieutenant 
governor. See, e.g., HAw. CoNST. art. V, §§ 1-6. On the definition of political cultures among 
the states, see ELAZAR, supra note 65, at 112-31. 
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agencies that are normally assumed by state legislators to have a 
presumptive power to apply for federal funds and generally initiate 
policymaking within their jurisdiction. Of course, assuming that the 
state constitution permitted such legislation, the state legislature , 
could impose stricter limits by requiring even constitutionally rec­
ognized state and local institutions to preclear grant applications 
with the state government. 
Why should the presumption apply only to state laws that at­
tempt to redirect federal grant revenue to state-favored interest 
groups? The reason is rooted in the fact that these revenue­
enhancing laws are least likely to be related to the efficient supervi­
sion of local governments. As argued in Part I, local governments 
require considerable supervision, because their regulations can eas­
ily impose external costs on nonresidents. State governments are 
simply more capable than the federal government of providing the 
best level of supervision. To presume that state governments can­
not place any limits on local governments' use of federal grants 
would be to eliminate such useful supervision. Therefore, it is pru­
dent not to employ the presumption of institutional autonomy to 
state laws that absolutely and unconditionally prohibit local govern­
ments from engaging in certain activities deemed undesirable by 
the state government. If, for instance, state law withholds from 
counties the power to enact zoning regulations, then the counties 
should not obtain such a power simply because the federal govern­
ment has bestowed an unrestricted grant on the county: the federal 
government is not as well-suited as the state government to assess 
the likelihood that counties will use such a power to impose exter­
nal costs on nonresidents (through, say, so-called "exclusionary 
zoning" that eliminates opportunities for affordable housing). 
These considerations about preserving state supervisory control 
do not apply as strongly, however, to revenue-enhancing regula­
tions that do not prohibit any local activity as inefficient or other­
wise undesirable. If the state law constrains local government 
discretion only to the extent that the local government's activities 
are funded by federal revenues, then the natural inference is that 
the state legislature is motivated by a desire to control federal reve­
nue, and not a desire to correct some institutional weakness of the 
local government. For instance, state offset rules that effectively 
deprive school districts of their federal impact aid do nothing to 
restrict school districts' power over own-source revenues generated 
by the local millage. If there were some institutional flaw in school 
district governance that needed correcting, then one would expect 
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that the state legislature would more systematically reform the local 
government. But, if the state legislature simply deprives the school 
districts of their federal money, then one reasonably infers that the 
state legislature is not concerned about any weakness in local gov­
ernments' structure or incentives but instead wishes only to confis­
cate federal grants for its own purposes. Such state rules represent 
the needless centralization of control over federal revenue, and 
courts should construe federal law to bar such centralization. 
One might agree that the presumption is sensible as a matter of 
policy. But why is it good law? What conventional sources of legal 
authority support such a canon of construction? 
The legislative context of direct federal-local grant programs 
supports the presumption of institutional autonomy. The congres­
sional decision to bypass state legislatures and send federal funds 
directly to local governments during the New Deal126 and later dur­
ing the Johnson and Nixon administrations was a fundamental 
transformation of American federalism.127 The fight among gover­
nors, mayors, counties, and townships for federal dollars has always 
been highly partisan (Republicans favoring the states and Demo­
crats favoring the cities),128 mapping onto the politics of race and 
poverty. In the words of Senator Muskie, state governments were 
thought to be "unsympathetic [to] the problems of urban areas."129 
Congressional decisions to use local rather than state agents are, in 
short, deliberate and well-informed, and they usually are accompa­
nied by intense intergovernmental controversy. Given this legisla­
tive context, it seems sensible to employ the presumption of 
institutional autonomy as a default rule for construing federal-local 
grant programs: when Congress specifies localities as the recipients 
of federal money, it really means localities and not the state gener­
ally. In this respect, Justice White's analysis of the federal PILOT 
program in Lawrence County more accurately captures the flavor of 
such federal-local relations than does Justice Rehnquist's dissenting 
opinion invoking Hunter. 
126. See GELFAND, supra note 122. 
127. See Catherine Lovell, Community Development Block Grant: The Role of Federal 
Requirements, PuBLIUS, Summer 1983, at 85. 
128. The controversy is most famously illustrated by the struggle between the governors 
and mayors during the 1970s for control over block grants and revenue sharing funds. For a 
summary of this controversy, see CoNLAN, supra note 12, at 59; HAIDER, supra note 56, at 77-
117; Farber, supra note 120, at 27-49. 
129. Hearings, supra note 123, at 63. The tendency for Democrats to distrust state gov­
ernments and favor cities continued into the Reagan administration. See REAGAN AND nm 
CITIES (George E. Peterson & Carol W. Lewis eds., 1986). 
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What about the remedies for violation of grant conditions pro­
vided by the presumption of institutional autonomy? Even assum­
ing that federal grants to local governments ought to be construed 
to exclude revenue-enhancing state regulations, why should the 
remedy for such state laws be invalidation of those laws? Why 
should not courts instead declare that the local government is ineli­
gible for federal funds? 
The answer to this objection is rooted in the definition of the 
presumption of institutional autonomy - the application of the 
presumption only to revenue-enhancing state laws. By definition, 
such laws are not enacted because the lawmaker has any objection 
to the local program authorized by the federal government and im­
plemented by the local government. The state law is not designed 
to stop any pernicious local behavior but simply to expropriate fed­
eral funds for goals that the state government values more highly. 
Given these assumptions, it is eminently reasonable to presume 
that, if faced with the choice between the loss of federal grant reve­
nue altogether and the loss of the power to redirect such revenue 
for purposes rejected by Congress, the state lawmakers would pre­
fer the loss of the latter and would waive its revenue-enhancing 
conditions on the federal grant. After all, if the state were to lose 
the federal grant altogether because of noncompliance with grant 
conditions, it would a fortiori lose its power to reallocate the grant 
for the purpose of enhancing state revenues. Therefore, the default 
rule that most accurately captures the state lawmakers' probable 
intent is the rule that such lawmakers would sooner surrender their 
capacity to impose revenue-enhancing measures on local govern­
ments than prevent their local governments from obtaining any fed­
eral grant revenue at all. 
When state laws serve regulatory rather than revenue-enhancing 
purposes, however, the presumption of institutional autonomy is in­
appropriate: rather than enjoin such regulatory state limits on local 
discretion when they are inconsistent with federal grant conditions, 
the Court should remand the case to the trial court to give state 
officials an opportunity to withdraw from the federal grant pro­
gram. So, for instance, in Wheeler v. Barrera, 13o the Court was con­
fronted with the question of whether Missouri's refusal to allow 
public school teachers to provide special education services in paro­
chial schools violated the terms of Title I of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act. The Court held that Missouri could 
130. 417 U.S. 402 (1974). 
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achieve compliance with the federal grant program either by pro­
viding comparable special education services to students of private 
and public schools or by simply withdrawing from the federal pro­
gram and declining federal special education money.131 In such a 
case, there is a genuine question about whether state lawmakers -
either the state legislature or the state constitution's framers -
would prefer to receive federal revenue or would rather maintain 
regulatory restrictions on school districts. The appropriate re­
sponse of the courts, therefore, is to remand the case to the trial 
court so that the responsible state officials litigating the case have 
an opportunity to withdraw from the federal program rather than 
waive a restriction that they might value more highly than federal 
revenue.132 
By failing to recognize the distinction between regulatory and 
revenue-enhancing state laws, courts may unwisely allow local gov­
ernments to liberate themselves unilaterally from state control sim­
ply by accepting federal grants inconsistent with such control. The 
dangers of this misguided approach toward federal grant programs 
is well-illustrated by the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit in United States v. City of New Haven.133 In New 
Haven, the City of New Haven accepted a $750,000 grant from the 
Federal Aviation Administration to extend an airport clear zone 
into the territory of the neighboring town of East Haven. The Sec­
ond Circuit held that the federal grant authorized New Haven to 
extend the clear zone even though Connecticut law expressly pro­
hibited such airport expansion unless the governing body of the 
town in which the land was located consented to the expansion.134 
The regulatory purpose of the prohibition was obvious: airport ex­
pansions impose extraordinary costs on neighbors, and cities that 
131. See Wheeler, 417 U.S. at 425. 
132. This is not to say that courts should never enjoin state laws inconsistent with federal 
grant conditions. If the state government itself, through statute enacted by the state legisla­
ture, has expressly acceded to such conditions, then it might be perfectly appropriate to en­
join state laws inconsistent with the terms under which federal money has been awarded to 
the state government. In King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 {1968), for instance, the Court enforced 
federal grant conditions governing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) by 
simply enjoining Alabama's "substitute father" rule limiting eligibility for AFDC assistance. 
In King, the Alabama legislature had already assented to participate in the AFDC program 
by submitting a plan to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare {HEW) and ac­
cepting federal revenue even after the HEW had promulgated the "Flemming Ruling" out­
lawing the "substitute father" regulation. In effect, the Court simply enforced the "contract" 
between Alabama and the federal government with the remedy of specific performance. See 
Allanson S. Willcox, The Function and Nature of Grants, 22 ADMIN. L. REv. 125, 133 {1969). 
133. 447 F.2d 972 {2d Cir. 1971). 
134. See New Haven, 447 F.2d at 973. 
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expand airport facilities into neighboring municipalities may well be 
subsidizing their own economic development by effectively confis­
cating property values from nonvoting nonresidents. Nevertheless, 
the Second Circuit reasoned that, under the Supremacy Clause, 
state law could not interfere with this federal-local agreement gov­
erning the use of navigable airspace.135 
This article maintains that New Haven's holding was wrong as a 
matter of law and policy. The power of the federal government to 
preempt state laws under the Supremacy Clause depends on the 
state's voluntary acceptance of federal money, and Connecticut had 
never accepted any federal grant. Moreover, there is no reason to 
assume that Connecticut would prefer to waive its regulatory limit 
on towns' condemnation powers to enrich one town at the expense 
of another.136 The Second Circuit should have followed the proce­
dure later suggested by Wheeler: it should have remanded the case 
to the trial court with instructions that the state government should 
be permitted to intervene so that the state, not the city, could de­
cide whether or not to forfeit the grant or waive the state law limit­
ing New Haven's powers. Once the State of Connecticut 
determines that the costs of airport expansion exceed the benefits, 
the final decision concerning the powers of the City of New Haven 
ought to have been reserved to the State of Connecticut: the pre­
sumption of institutional autonomy, after all, is only a presumption 
and not an irrebuttable one. 
The presumption of institutional autonomy also helps answer a 
second question that occasionally excites judicial controversy - the 
issue of whether local governments should have standing to enforce 
the terms of federal grant programs against the state government. 
Courts sometimes hold that local governments should lack such 
standing because they are "creatures of the state" that are incapa­
ble of asserting rights against the government that created them.137 
This reasoning, however, is confused. As noted above in section 
I.A, while Hunter might bar local governments from asserting fed-
135. See New Haven, 447 F.2d at 973-74. 
136. State governments were acutely aware of the danger that municipal airports might 
impose spillover effects on nonresidents. During the 1945 hearings on the Civil Aeronautics 
Act, the Council of State Governments urged that federal money for airports be channelled 
through the states to ensure that an impartial level of government would arbitrate such dis­
putes. See RoscoE C. MARTIN, THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 95 (1965). 
137. See Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. No. 40 v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240, 1242 
(9th Cir. 1996); City of East St. Louis v. Circuit Court, 986 F.2d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1993); 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Regional Transp. Auth., 653 F.2d 1149, 1152 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(holding that the municipality lacks standing to challenge state law under Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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eral constitutional rights against the state government, this conclu­
sion hardly implies that local governments cannot enforce federal 
statutes against state governments. If Congress intends local offi­
cials to serve as federal agents responsible for implementing federal 
law, then there is no sensible reason why such officials cannot en­
force the federal grant program against the state. They are, after 
all, the officials with the greatest vested interest in protecting their 
discretion under the federal grant program: federal agencies may 
likely underenforce federal grant conditions relating to local auton­
omy, either because they lack the resources to monitor state com­
pliance or because they wish to preserve their resources for other 
battles deemed more important to the success of the program. 
Therefore, whenever the federal government gives local govern­
ments a role to play in implementing federal programs, courts 
should presume that those local governments have standing to pro­
tect this role. 
One might argue, however, that such a rule for construing 
federal-local grant legislation flies in the face of Supreme Court 
precedents like Gregory v. Ashcroft, 138 which require federal stat­
utes to be construed to preserve rather than erode state autonomy. 
In Gregory, the Court refused to construe ADEA's ban on 
mandatory retirement to invalidate state laws requiring the retire­
ment of state judges at the age of seventy. Given the importance of 
state autonomy as an element of constitutional structure, the Court 
reasoned that it could not construe ADEA to work such an intru­
sion into state governments' internal structure unless such a result 
was required by ADEA's plain language.139 In short, the Court 
normally interprets ambiguous federal statutes to favor rather than 
limit state autonomy. Why, then, should one construe ambiguous 
grant statutes to restrict the powers of state legislature to impose 
revenue-enhancing laws? 
One might answer this question by noting that the presumption 
of institutional autonomy is rooted in precisely the same sort of rea­
soning as Gregory. The conventional defense of Gregory is that, by 
requiring Congress to overrule state autonomy expressly and 
clearly with a plain statement, Gregory's "plain statement" rule 
helps to protect federalism through the national political process -
congressional markup, debates, committee reports, etc. The Court 
might deploy such an indirect strategy for protecting federalism be-
138. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
139. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470. 
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cause the Court might lack a clear legal standard for determining 
when intrusions on state autonomy go too far, and the Court also 
might lack confidence in the judicial capacity to make the complex 
empirical judgments necessary to evaluate whether judicially im­
posed doctrines of state autonomy will excessively impede Con­
gress's legitimate national powers. By encouraging Congress to 
confront these issues, Gregory's "plain statement" rule allows the 
Court to sidestep these difficulties, in effect delegating their solu­
tion to interest groups seeking national action, who must make the 
case before Congress for express intervention in state political 
structure.140 
But one can defend the presumption of institutional autonomy 
with a mirror image of this reasoning: while Gregory uses a plain 
statement rule to protect federalism through the national political 
process, the presumption of institutional autonomy uses a plain 
statement to protect nationalism through the states' political 
processes. The presumption, after all, does not give Congress an 
unlimited power to dissect the state and liberate local officials from 
the control of the state legislature. The state legislature remains 
free to bar cities and counties from applying for federal grants if the 
state constitution permits such a prohibition: the only requirement 
is that the state legislature must speak clearly by specifying that lo­
cal governments' failure to comply with state law should render 
those local governments ineligible for federal money. As with 
Gregory, the presumption of institutional autonomy can be justified 
as a way to ensure that the political process - the state political 
process - carefully considers an important constitutional value -
effective national spending programs - before foreclosing local 
participation in those programs. 
Moreover, the same concerns that motivate indirect protection 
of federalism through a plain statement rule in Gregory also suggest 
similar indirect protection of nationalism through a plain statement 
rule. After all, just as the Court might be reluctant to give the 
states the power to resist generally applicable laws such as the 
ADEA, so too, as explained in sections I.A and B, the Court might 
be reluctant to give Congress an unlimited power to dissect the 
state. The precedential basis for such a power is uncertain and the 
140. For a defense of this sort of reasoning, see Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory of 
Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE LJ. 979, 1006·07 (1993). For a 
less sanguine opinion about Gregory, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi· 
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 V AND. L. REv. 
593, 62945 (1992). 
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empirical consequences of such dissection of the state might be 
harmful. The Court can avoid such a potentially dangerous exten­
sion of national power by requiring state legislatures to speak 
plainly if they wish to exercise their prerogative to withdraw their 
local governments from federal intergovernmental arrangements. 
Thus, just as Gregory allows the Court to avoid the controversial 
extension of federalism norms by requiring Congress to exercise its 
powers of national supremacy with a plain statement, so too does 
the presumption of institutional autonomy allow the Court to avoid 
the controversial extension of Congress's powers by requiring state 
legislatures to exercise their powers of state supremacy - their 
supremacy over local governmental institutions - with a plain 
statement.141 
Such a "plain statement" rule provides a powerful protection to 
Congress. In theory, a state legislature might require its local gov­
ernments to preclear all applications for federal money with some 
central state agency. Likewise, state legislatures might simply enact 
a blanket rule that local governments shall be ineligible for federal 
grants whenever they fail to comply with all state laws. In practice, 
however, one would expect state legislatures to be extremely reluc­
tant to limit local governments' capacity to engage in "grantsman­
ship," as any such limit will impose onerous financial burdens on 
the state's citizens: local government initiative in seeking federal 
money is an important source of revenue for the state.142 Espe­
cially if the state legislature has merely a revenue-enhancing motive 
for controlling federal-local grants, one would expect that the state 
legislature would prefer to waive such controls rather than confess 
to the electorate that it wished to deprive the voters of federal 
money.143 
141. For a helpful discussion of the relationship between "substantive" constitutional Iiin­
its and "procedural" requirements that legislative bodies make findings or otherwise deliber· 
ate about constitutional matters, see Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional 
Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 
695 (1996). 
142. Local offcials' support for intergovernmental transfers is frequently critical for in· 
ducing Congress to enact such measures. See, e.g., TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERAL­
ISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 67-68, 222 
(1998) (describing importance of Mayors' lobbying efforts for enacting General Revenue 
Sharing and defeating Clinton's block grant proposals). 
143. There have been several instances in which state legislatures have decided to elimi­
nate legislative preclearance for grant applications simply because such preclearance 
presented too great an administrative headache for the legislature. See Carol S. Weissert, 
State Legislatures and Federal Funds: An Issue of the 1980s, Pusuus, Summer 1981, at 67, 
72-73. 
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Admittedly, the presumption of institutional autonomy has not 
been expressly defended in any judicial opinion (although it is im­
plicitly suggested by Lawrence County). Nevertheless, such a 
"plain statement" rule bears a family resemblance to other judi­
cially created "plain statement" rules governing local governments' 
immunities from federal law. Consider, for instance, local govern­
ments' immunity from antitrust liability under Parker v. Brown.144 
In a series of opinions, the Supreme Court has held that the Parker 
doctrine, which exempts state legislative programs from the scope of 
federal antitrust laws, does not automatically protect local govern­
ments from antitrust liability.145 In order for local governments to 
enjoy such an exemption from federal antitrust laws, local govern­
ments must act pursuant to a "clearly articulated" state policy "to 
displace competition with regulation or monopoly public ser­
vice. "146 In effect, the Court has held that, while Congress has con­
ferred immunity from antitrust lawsuits on state governments, state 
governments cannot delegate this immunity to their local govern­
ments unless the state legislature issues a plain statement clearly 
endorsing local governments' anticompetitive conduct.147 
The presumption of institutional autonomy provides an analo­
gous "plain statement" rule, albeit one that enhances, rather than 
detracts from, local governments' powers. The presumption de­
fended here provides that local governments should enjoy the bene­
fit of federal-local grants, absent clear state laws denying such local 
authority. By contrast, City of Boulder provides that, absent clear 
state laws authorizing local anticompetitive polices, local govern­
ments do not enjoy the federal benefit of antitrust immunity.148 
While the two "plain statement" rules cut in opposite directions, 
both address the same fundamental issue: the level of state legisla­
tive supervision of nonfederal governmental officials that is consis­
tent with those officials' exercise of federally derived powers. It 
144. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
145. See City of Columbia Adver., Inc. v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 
(1991); FISher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986), rehg. denied, 475 U.S. 1150 (1986); 
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Community Communications Co. v. 
City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 
U.S. 389 (1978) (plurality). 
146. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413; see also City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52. 
147. Admittedly, recent opinions make clear that the state legislature's "plain statement" 
need not be all that plain. For instance, the Court has held that the state has articulated local 
governments' exclusion of competition against existing billboard owners when the state legis­
lature simply enacts a zoning enabling act authorizing the regulation of land uses such as 
billboards. See Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. at 372. 
148. See City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52-55 (holding that authorization in state constitu­
tion's home rule provision was insufficiently precise to bestow Parker immunity on city). 
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should hardly be surprising that the proper default rule should vary 
with the purposes of the federal program. In the context of federal 
antitrust policy, the Court best protects the federal program by re­
quiring close state legislative supervision of local governments. Af­
ter all, as Justice Brennan noted repeatedly in City of Lafayette, 
local governments pursuing "maximum benefits for the community 
constituency"149 are likely to regulate "without regard to extra­
territorial impact and regional efficiency,"150 in pursuit of "their 
own parochial interests."151 By contrast, when Congress bestows 
money directly on local governments, the proper background as­
sumption is that Congress's policy will be best advanced by presum­
ing exclusion of state control of the money. 
But note that, whether the "plain statement" rule encourages or 
discourages state legislative control of local governments' exercise 
of federal powers, the default rule preserves the principle of state 
supremacy. Regardless of the default rule, the state legislature re­
mains free to deprive its subdivisions of both Parker immunity and 
the power to apply for federal grants-in-aid. Both presumptions, in 
short, preserve the essential element of state supremacy over 
nonfederal governments while simultaneously promoting the na­
tional interest in cooperative federalism. 
In sum, the result in Lawrence County makes sense as an exam­
ple of the presumption of institutional autonomy. When local gov­
ernments receive federal revenue directly from the federal 
government, the courts ought to presume that the state government 
has no right to enhance its own revenues by regulating the alloca­
tion of the federal grant. The proper remedy, moreover, ought to 
be injunction of the state revenue-enhancing law. This presumption 
of local control, however, ought not to apply to any regulatory state 
laws that define the powers and jurisdiction of local governments 
without regard to the source of revenue funding local government 
activities. The principle of state supremacy requires the courts to 
give state lawmakers the last word about whether local govern­
ments will act as agents of the federal government, and the pre­
sumption of institutional autonomy is well-calculated to give the 
state such control. 
149. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 403. 
150. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 404. 
151. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408. 
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B. Construing Federal Grant Programs and State Constitutional 
Provisions to Protect Intragovernment Competition Between State 
Executive and Legislative Branches 
The federal government does not dissect the state simply by lib­
erating local governments from state law. Federal grants-in-aid 
have also liberated state executive officials from the control of state 
legislatures. As explained below, such federal empowerment of 
governors has its uses: it can increase intragovernmental competi­
tion for federal revenue, which can, in turn, reduce the ability of 
state governments to engage in inefficient strategic behavior when 
negotiating over the content and implementation of intergovern­
mental regulatory schemes. 
1. The History of Struggles Between Legislatures and Governors 
for Control Over Federal Grants 
Before one attempts any evaluation of executive control over 
federal grants, it is important to have a brief overview of how the 
federal government has historically dissected the state, freeing state 
agencies from the control of state law. During the 1960s, both Con­
gress and federal agencies generally preferred to bestow grant 
funds on nonelected professionals - officials who specialized in the 
delivery of a particular service and, although nominally under the 
control of state politicians, were insulated from political control by 
civil service rules as well as by professional loyalties that often 
made them more loyal to their federal counterpart agency than to 
the state legislature or governor.152 Throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, mayors and governors struggled against such insulation of 
appointed agency experts from their control. Swallowing many of 
their differences with each other, state and local executive politi­
cians succeeded in persuading both Congress and the President to 
give them greater control over federal funds.153 Nixon's successful 
promotion of block grants and revenue sharing effectively gave 
elected executive "generalists" new power over federal revenue at 
the expense of the appointed policy "specialists." 
152. For instance, the grant programs of Johnson's creative federalism strongly en­
couraged such control of federal funds by state agency "specialists" with "single-agency" re­
quirements, thus requiring federal grants to be controlled by an agency specializing in the 
delivery of the particular service that Congress wished to encourage. See WRIGHT, supra 
note 12, at 83-86. 
153. See CoNLAN, supra note 74, at 67 (describing "lingering suspicions and bitterness" 
that afflicted relations between governors and mayors). 
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The success of the elected executive officials, however, ushered 
in a new stage of intragovernmental competition among elected 
policy generalists: by the mid-1970s, state legislators began to fight 
with governors for greater control of federal grant revenue.154 'fyp­
ically, state legislatures asserted such control by appropriating fed­
eral grants with varying degrees of specificity and barring governors 
(or other state executive officials) from expending any federal reve­
nue above the amounts specifically appropriated for purposes ap­
proved by the state legislature. 
Such legislative efforts to control federal money met with mixed 
success, for both practical and legal reasons. In four states, the 
state supreme courts ruled that state legislatures were legally 
barred from appropriating such federal grant revenue.155 The state 
courts were not completely clear about whether the source of this 
limit on state legislatures' powers was the state constitutional "sep­
aration of powers" doctrine, federal grant conditions, or some com­
bination of both.156 In any case, state legislators lobbied Congress 
to amend federal grants to ensure that state legislatures exercised 
ultimate control over the federal funds.157 But, despite these pleas 
and a significant 1977 decision in favor of state legislative control by 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 158 Congress has done little to 
clarify the role of state legislatures in appropriating federal 
grants.159 Moreover, even in states where state legislative appropri-
154. See WruaHT, supra note 12, at 276. 
155. See Navajo Tribe v. Arizona Dept. of Admin., 528 P.2d 623 (Ariz. 1975); MacManus 
v. Love, 499 P.2d 609 {Colo. 1972); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 378 N.E.2d 433 
{Mass. 1978); Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974). 
156. These decisions' reasoning tended to be ambiguous as to the precise source of the 
limit on state legislative power: they reasoned that such appropriation was barred by state 
constitutional "separation of powers," because the grants came impressed with a federal pur­
pose that the executive branch was charged with executing. Such a "separation of powers" 
argument, however, seemed to collapse into an argument about the federal conditions at­
tached to the federal grant by Congress: in effect, the state courts seemed to argue that 
Congress intended the revenue to be controlled exclusively by governors. For a summary of 
such arguments, see George D. Brown, Federal Funds and National Supremacy: The Role of 
State Legislatures in Federal Grant Programs, 28 AM. U. L. REv. 279, 285-87 (1979). 
157. In 1977, Edmund Muskie, chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental 
Relations held hearings on legislative oversight of federal funds at which the majority of 
witnesses - primarily state legislators and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations - called for greater state control of federal grant revenue. See Role of State Legis­
latures in Appropriating Federal Funds to the States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Inter­
governmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Govt. Affairs, 95th Cong. (1977). 
158. See Shapp v. Sloan, 391 A.2d 595 {Pa. 1978). 
159. The state legislatures' most salient victory occurred in 1995, when, at the urging of 
the National Conference of State Legislatures, U.S. Senator Hank Brown successfully spon­
sored the "Brown Amendment" to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
block grant program, a provision providing that state legislatures could appropriate federal 
block grant revenue for temporary assistance or for child care. The Brown Amendment pro-
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ation might be legally permissible, many states use only the vaguest 
open-ended appropriations to allocate federal grants, relying on ex­
ecutive agencies to allocate the funds among subprograms.160 
State legislators typically defend a greater state legislative role 
in the allocation of federal grants as a way to ensure that some state 
agency comprehensively compares and ranks competing specialized 
state agencies' proposals for expenditure of grant revenue.161 Ab­
sent a requirement of state legislative appropriation, state officials 
might continue programs with federal funds even after the state leg­
islature has terminated state funding for such programs.162 Worse 
yet, such state agencies might even practically commit the state leg­
islature to continue to provide state funds for such programs be­
cause the existence of federal funding would create a class of 
program beneficiaries and officials who would lobby on behalf of 
continued state matching funds in order to retain federal money.163 
Based on these CO:Q.cerns, both the Advisory Commission on Inter­
governmental Relations (now defunct) and state legislatures have 
vided that "[a]ny funds received by a State under the provisions of law specified in [TANF] 
shall be subject to appropriation by the State legislature, consistent with the terms and condi­
tions required under such provisions of [TANF]." See Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193 § 901, 110 Stat. 2105, 2347 
(1996), quoted in 42 U.S.C. § 601 app. (1998). This provision did not conclusively resolve all 
of the ambiguity concerning state legislative control even in the narrow context of the TANF 
program: at most, it declared that state legislatures could "appropriate" TANF funds, with­
out specifying how much or what sort of appropriation was "consistent with the terms and 
conditions of [TANF]." 
160. Five state legislatures - Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, and New Mex­
ico - still do not appropriate federal grant revenue at all but rather allow the governor or 
executive agency to apply for federal grants and spend it free from direct legislative over­
sight. An additional seven states - Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, North Carolina, West 
Vrrginia, and WISconsin - provide only open-ended authorizations for executive agencies to 
spend federal funds: these states place no cap on the federal grant revenue that an agency 
can expend, and they do not appropriate federal grant revenue to specific subprograms ad­
ministered by the grant-obtaining agency. Minnesota sometimes appropriates specific 
amounts of federal grant revenue for specified federal programs. Minnesota, however, pro­
vides an "open and standing" authorization for state agencies to expend federal funds. Texas 
and Utah allow the expenditure of unanticipated federal funds. See LEGISLATIVE FINANCE 
PAPER No. 98: LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL FUNDs 6-7, 9 (1995) (written by Ar­
turo Perez for the National Conference of State Legislatures). 
161. See Hearings, supra note 123, at 79-85 (statement of the U.S. Advisory Commn. on 
Intergovernmental Relations). 
162. See, e.g., AssEMBLY WAYS & MEANS CoMM., supra note 123, at 9-12. This state 
report describes instances in which the state legislature terminated state funding for various 
agency activities - travel expenses for state university researchers, high school instructional 
projects, psychiatric treatment for youth, etc. - only to have the agencies make up the 
shortfall with federal grant revenue. 
163. See Hearings, supra note 123, at 22-26 (noting that "employees, local organizations, 
recipients of services" funded by federal matching grants form a "constituency" that lobbies 
against discontinuing the program). 
1256 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 97:1201 
recommended legal reforms to increase the power of state legisla­
tures over federal funds.164 
I argue that these proposals for total legislative control over fed­
eral grant revenue are overstated. Comprehensive budgeting might 
well be needed, but there is no reason why governors and state 
budget officers cannot provide it in as competent a manner as legis­
lative finance committees.165 This is not to say that state legisla­
tures should not play a significant role in controlling federal grants 
- they should. As explained in section II.A of this article, how­
ever, the intergovernmental system may work best when no single 
state institution exercises a monopoly over federal money. When 
state institutions compete with each other to secure federal reve­
nue, one improves the odds of faithful state adherence to state­
federal bargains. In sections II.B.2 and 3 below, I explain how the 
presumption of institutional autonomy might be used to construe 
the powers of governors over federal grants. As suggested below, 
such a presumption might enable the federal government to exploit 
competition between state legislators and governors to minimize 
strategic behavior by either institution. 
2. The Definition of the Presumption of Institutional Autonomy 
in the Context of Federal Grants to Governors 
Before one attempts to justify the presumption, it is helpful to 
explain more fully what the presumption would require. What ex­
actly does it mean to promote the diffusion of power among state 
institutions where federal grants are concerned? Consider, first, 
how courts could increase the power of governors through their 
construction of state constitutional principles: courts could allow 
governors to disregard state legislative appropriations of federal 
grant revenue that are inconsistent with the implementation plan 
164. ACIR recommended a model state bill and model state constitutional amendment, 
requiring that the state legislature appropriate federal grant funds to specific subprograms 
and prohibit agencies from expending grant funds above these appropriated amounts without 
legislative approval. See Hearings, supra note 123, at 98-111. The state legislatures con­
curred with these recommendations - but they also argued that federal statutes be amended 
to include state legislatures as the co-recipient of federal grant revenues so that courts would 
not construe federal grant programs to give governors exclusive control over federal funds. 
See id. at 59 (statement of Representative James Ritter, Chair, Federal-State Relations 
Comm., Pa. House of Representatives). 
165. See .ADVISORY CoMMN. ON lNrERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 121, at 
96-100 (cataloguing the ways in which state budget officers and governors review executive 
agencies' grant applications). ACIR's survey showed that, out of 34 state budget officers 
responding to the survey, 13 precleared all grant applications, while 20 precleared some grant 
applications of subordinate state agencies. 1}7pically, state governments do not preclear the 
grant applications of the state's public universities. 
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submitted by the governor to obtain the grant. Such a rule would 
benefit governors simply because the governor is the official most 
responsible for drafting and submitting implementation plans to 
federal agencies: state legislatures typically play little role in the 
grant application process. By binding the state to adhere to the 
plan, the presumption of institutional autonomy would enable gov­
ernors to use the implementation plan as a way to appropriate fed­
eral grants for purposes that would trump later contrary legislative 
appropriation. 
So, for instance, suppose that a governor submits an implemen­
tation plan to the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) in order to obtain a block grant under the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. The TANF stat­
ute gives states the option of seeking an exemption from work re­
quirements for mothers with children younger than one year.166 If 
the state plan provides that the state applies for this exemption and 
state law is otherwise silent on the issue of the exemption, then, 
after the state receives the block grant, the state legislature ought to 
be barred from appropriating the TANF block grant revenue in 
ways that would require mothers with infants to seek employment 
in order to receive assistance.167 The presumption of institutional 
autonomy, in other words, would allow the governor's plan to de­
prive the state legislature of an appropriation option that would 
otherwise be allowed to the legislature by federal law. In effect, the 
governor and not the state legislature would speak for "the 
state. "168 
It is important to emphasize that the practical effect of such a 
limit on the state legislature's appropriation power would probably 
depend on the remedy available for illegal appropriations. The 
remedy of merely withholding federal funds from noncomplying 
state legislatures might be entirely ineffective: one can imagine that 
few governors or federal agencies would be willing to scuttle federal 
funding for a program in order to enforce implementation plans 
against recalcitrant state legislatures. If the federal agency could 
enjoin the inconsistent appropriation measure and simply bestow 
the federal grant on the governor as, in effect, a lump-sum appro-
166. Pub. L. No. 104-193, §103.A.407(b)(5), 110 Stat. 2105, 2131 (1996). 
167. This precise controversy occurred in Colorado when Governor Roy Romer sought 
the exemption for mothers with infants, over the objections of key legislators in the State 
Assembly. Eventually, the governor backed down and withdrew the application of the 
exemption. 
168. I discuss the ambiguities of the TANF legislation at infra notes 169-172. 
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priation, then the limit on the legislature's power to appropriate 
federal grants would be quite significant. 
It is important as well to note that, despite the proposed limit on 
the state legislature's power to appropriate federal grant revenue, 
state legislatures would still have at least three different ways to 
control federal grants. First, the state legislature would retain the 
power to enact substantive legislation requiring the inclusion or ex­
clusion of elements - exemptions from work requirements for 
mothers with infants in TANF plans submitted to the IIBS - in 
any state implementation plan submitted to a federal agency.169 
Thus, the governor could not commit the state to the implementa­
tion of federal law in ways that contradicted substantive state legis­
lation. Second, the state legislature still could appropriate federal 
grant revenue in ways that did not contradict the implementation 
plan submitted by the state government. H the governor, therefore, 
submits a vague implementation plan to the federal agency, then 
the legislature will have plenty of room to control the allocation of 
federal funds in the interstices of the state's plan. Finally, the state 
legislature still could control any federal grants for which the fed­
eral government required matching state dollars, simply by refusing 
to appropriate the required state contribution and thereby prevent 
federal dollars from being directed to programs to which the state 
legislature objected.170 
These means of legislative control are significant, but they do 
not render nugatory the gubernatorial power provided by the pre­
sumption of institutional autonomy. The state legislature in theory 
could prevent the governor from ever submitting an implementa­
tion plan contrary to the state legislature's views simply by enacting 
a substantive statute barring such an application. In practice, how­
ever, it will be practically and legally difficult for a state legislature 
- a multi-member body with multiple contending factions - to 
use substantive statutes to determine the multitude of operational 
details of federal programs. The governor will, therefore, have sig­
nifi.cant power to fill in the gaps of substantive legislation in his or 
169. This technique has been used primarily with federal assistance dollars. Under both 
the AFDC and the recently enacted TANF, federal law provided states with the option of 
applying for "waivers" from federal requirements and seeking "exemptions" from certain 
otherwise applicable requirements - say, the requirement that women with children under 
the age of one year obtain employment. Governors and state legislatures have fought major 
political struggles over whether or not to apply for such relaxation of federal regulatory 
standards. 
170. This is how Colorado legislature controls all federal grants awarded on a matching 
basis. The Colorado legislature has no power to appropriate federal grants directly under the 
state constitution. 
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her administration of the federal grant.171 The state legislature may 
attempt to reduce obstacles to collective action by delegating over­
sight of grant applications to a special committee of key legislators. 
Under many state constitutions, however, such a delegation would 
violate principles of separation of powers.172 
3. The Justification for the Presumption of Institutional 
Autonomy in the Context of Grants to Governors 
Why use the presumption of institutional autonomy to give gov­
ernors the power to constrain state legislative power over federal 
grant revenues? As with the presumption of local autonomy de­
fended in section II.A.2, I justify the presumption of gubernatorial 
autonomy in terms of sensible policy, judicial doctrine, and the leg­
islative history of grant programs. 
As suggested in section II.A, competition between nonfederal 
governmental institutions can sometimes promote efficiency in the 
intergovernmental system by reducing the costs of monitoring 
nonfederal agents of the federal government. I maintain that the 
presumption of institutional autonomy might produce precisely this 
sort of efficiency by allowing the federal agency to pit the governor 
and legislature against each other, lending weight to one or the 
other institution depending on their fidelity in implementing federal 
policies. If the governor is willing to submit a detailed implementa­
tion plan to the federal agency, then, under the presumption of in­
stitutional autonomy, such a plan would trump the appropriation; 
moreover, the remedy for illegal appropriations would be injunc­
tion of the appropriation measure and award of the grant directly to 
the governor as an unallocated lump sum. Thus, if the federal 
agency supports the governor's plan, then the federal agency can 
enjoin later state legislative appropriations that the agency deems 
to be less faithful to the goals of the federal program. 
On the other hand, if the governor submits a vague or unsatis­
factory plan to the federal agency, then the federal agency can re-
171. The governor also has a greater power to veto a piece of substantive legislation than 
a state appropriations measure allocating federal grants. By vetoing an appropriations mea­
sure, the governor would be depriving the federal grant program's beneficiaries of federal 
dollars. This consequence makes gubernatorial use of such vetoes politically unpalatable. By 
contrast, given the default rule that governors do not require express state authorization to 
apply for federal grants, if the governor vetoes substantive legislation, the availability of fed­
eral (or, for that matter, state) revenue is unaffected. In the substantive context, in other 
words, the default rule is gubernatorial power. 
172. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 532 A.2d 195 (Mass. 1987); General Assembly v. 
Byrne, 448 A.2d 438 (NJ. 1982); People v. Tremaine, 168 N.E. 817, 822 (N.Y. 1929); Tucker 
v. South Carolina Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 424 S.E.2d 468 (S.C. 1992). 
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frain from enforcing the plan and instead allow the state legislature 
to appropriate the grant for its own purposes. In effect, the pre­
sumption allows the federal agency to choose whether to give fed­
eral funds to the state legislature or governor, based on which 
institution most faithfully proposes to carry out the federal pro­
gram. Moreover, the competition for control of federal funds pro­
vides the federal agency with a practical sanction: rather than 
simply withdraw federal funds from the noncomplying state - a 
course of action that would actually undermine the federal program 
- the agency can simply accept or preempt the state legislature's 
appropriation, delivering the federal funds to the state branch most 
willing to carry out the program according to terms acceptable to 
the federal agency, without harm to the federal program's 
beneficiaries. 
The presumption of institutional autonomy, therefore, promises 
significant advantages in preventing strategic behavior by state gov­
ernments. But, apart from its benefits as a matter of policy, what is 
the basis for the principle in federal or state law? Is this presump­
tion a plausible way to construe either federal grant legislation or 
state constitutions in light of judicial doctrine, statutory or constitu­
tional text, and legislative history? 
Candor requires one to acknowledge the ambiguity of the usual 
sources of authority: the presumption is neither obviously required 
nor precluded by either the text, or judicial interpretations, of fed­
eral statutes or state constitutions. Moreover, the answer would 
vary immensely depending on the particular grant program or state 
constitution that one analyzes. Nevertheless, the presumption of 
institutional autonomy makes at least as much sense as rival ac­
counts: federal grant statutes and state constitutions do not ex­
pressly give state legislatures any absolute right to appropriate 
federal grant dollars in disregard of the governor's plan, but neither 
do they deprive state legislatures of all power over such grant 
revenue. 
Federal statutes typically bestow federal grants on state execu­
tive agencies or governors; outside the context of general revenue 
sharing, these laws are usually silent about the role of state legisla­
tures.173 But such silence should not be read to exclude state legis-
173. The recent exception to this practice has been the so·called Brown Amendment, 
which provides that two block grants "shall be subject to appropriation by the State legisla­
ture, consistent with the terms and conditions required under [the block grant provisions]." 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, § 901, 110 Stat. 2105, 2347 (1996), quoted in 42 U.S.C. § 601 app. (1998). Congress re­
peated similar language in 29 U.S.C. § 2941(a) (1998), providing that block grants for job 
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latures' role in appropriating federal revenue. Federal agencies 
have occasionally taken such an extreme view, arguing that the stat­
ute's reference to the governor as the applicant for federal funds 
precludes legislative involvement in the allocation of such 
money.174 This extreme position, however, is hard to justify: noth­
ing in the legislative history suggests a conscious congressional deci­
sion to exclude legislative involvement. Rather, the evidence 
suggests that Congress accidentally overlooked state legislatures 
rather than deliberately excluded them. As the OMB noted in 
1980, Congress and federal agencies simply find it easier to locate a 
single state executive official in charge of policymaking relevant to 
some federal grant.175 Because the "interface" between federal and 
state governments takes the form of a state executive official, it is 
natural for federal agencies and Congress to assume that such an 
official really constitutes the state government when designing fed­
eral grant programs. 
· Therefore, there seems little reason to exclude all legislative ap­
propriation of federal grants as a matter of federal law. Congress 
simply has no history of deliberately favoring governors over state 
legislatures in the same way that Congress has favored local govern­
ments over state governments with certain direct federal-local grant 
programs. But, at the same time, it would be equally odd to argue 
that the state legislature has some unlimited power to appropriate 
federal grants, regardless of the terms of implementation plan sub­
mitted by the governor. The grant program, after all, is analogous 
to a fee-for-service contract under which the state government un­
dertakes to advance some federally favored goal in return for fed­
eral money. No court has ever doubted that the state is bound to 
honor the terms of this "contract" when it accepts federal money.176 
But the terms to which the state agrees when it accepts the money 
are most obviously embodied in the implementation plan submitted 
to and accepted by the federal agency.177 Of course, the effects of 
training "shall be subject to appropriation by the state legislature, consistent with the terms 
and conditions required under [the Workforce Investment program]." 
174. See CoMPTROLLER GENERAL (GAO), FEDERAL AssrsrANCE SYsrEM SHOULD BE 
CHANGED TO PERMIT GREATER !NvoLVEMENT BY THE STATE LEGISLATURE 23-27 (GGD-
81-3 Dec. 15, 1980). 
175. See Letter from Wayne G. Granquist, Associate Dir., Management & Regulatory 
Policy, OMB, to Wrlliam J. Anderson, Director, GAO (Aug. 11, 1980), in App. IV, CoMP­
TROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CoNGRESS: FEDERAL AssrsrANCE SYsrEM SHOULD BE 
CHANGED TO PERMIT GREATER !NvoLVEMENT BY STATE LEGISLATURES app. IV (GGD-81-
3 Dec. 15, 1980). 
176. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Commn., 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). 
177. As the Court has noted, "there would be no reason to require a State to submit 
assurances to the [federal agency] if the statute did not require the State's findings to be 
1262 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1201 
the presumption of institutional autonomy would depend on the ac­
tual language of the particular federal grant legislation. The pre­
sumption is, after all, only a rule of construction. In unusual cases 
such as the Block Grants Section of the TANF program,178 it might 
be extremely difficult to argue that the governor's plan should limit 
the state legislature's power to appropriate the grant. Section 417 
of the TANF legislation, after all, provides that "[n]o officer or em­
ployee of the Federal Government may regulate the conduct of 
States under this part or enforce any provision of this part, except 
to the extent expressly provided in this part."179 One might argue 
that this provision bars any federal agency or court from enforcing 
the governor's implementation plan against the contrary wishes of 
the state legislature.180 Even in the case of TANF, however, there 
remains ambiguity about which branch of the state government 
truly speaks for "the state." If the governor wishes to enforce his or 
her own implementation plan against a contrary state legislative ap­
propriation, it is not obvious that the federal agency must regard 
the appropriation rather than the plan as the authoritative voice of 
the state. Congress certainly wanted to bar federal agencies from 
interfering excessively with state administration of the TANF pro­
gram.181 It is a little more ambiguous whether Congress intended 
to bar governors from exercising primary control over federal 
monies.182 
In short, one can make a respectable - but not irrebuttable -
argument that, at least absent language like section 417 of TANF, 
federal grant programs permit state legislatures to appropriate fed­
eral grant dollars - but only in ways that are consistent with the 
implementation plan submitted by the state. But what about state 
reviewable in some manner by the (federal agency]." Wiider v. Vrrginia Hosp. Assn., 496 
U.S. 498, 514 (1990). 
178. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103, 110 Stat. 2105, 2112-61 (1996). 
179. § 103.A.417, 110 Stat. at 2159. 
180. See Carl Thbbesing & Sheri Steisel, Answers to Your Welfare Worries, STATE LEGIS· 
LATURES, Jan. 1997, at 12 (arguing that "(t]he state plan does not have the effect of law and 
can be modified at any time"). 
181. See Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing "Revolution" and "Reform": Procedural Due 
Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 591, 620 (1998) (noting that welfare 
reform "was lobbied for by, and sold to, the states as a devolution of control over program 
content from the national to the local level"). 
182. While the TANF legislation includes the Brown Amendment authorizing state legis­
lative appropriation of TANF money, this authorization is limited to appropriations "consis­
tent with the terms and conditions required under (the Block grant provisions]." See supra 
note 173. One such term and condition is that the state submit a plan to implement the 
TANF program. 
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constitutions? Should they be construed to bar or limit legislative 
appropriation of federal grants? 
State courts have offered two extreme answers to this question, 
both of which (I argue) are equally mistaken. One answer, pro­
vided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, is that the state legisla­
ture's power to appropriate federal grants is unlimited. According 
to this view, the state legislature can appropriate federal grants 
even in ways that are inconsistent with the implementation plan 
submitted by the governor to obtain the grant from a federal 
agency.183 The second answer, provided by four other state courts, 
is that state constitutional "separation of powers" doctrines prohibit 
any legislative appropriation of federal grants.184 As I argue below, 
both of these theories are not required by law and make terrible 
policy. 
Consider, first, the position of Shapp v. Sloan185 that state legis­
latures ought to have unlimited powers to appropriate federal 
grants. In Shapp, the State Justice Commission, appointed by Gov­
ernor Milton Shapp, filed a law enforcement plan with the Federal 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in order to receive a 
block grant under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act (LEAA). 
The commission's plan called for the continued funding of the 
Pennsylvania Office of Special Prosecutor, an official who was then 
conducting a grand jury investigation into allegations of political 
corruption in Philadelphia.186 The state legislature, however, en­
acted statutes barring any expenditure of federal grant revenue 
without a specific legislative appropriation of such revenue for a 
particular program.187 The legislature then failed to appropriate 
any of the federal grant to fund the Office of the Special 
Prosecutor .188 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the legislature's re­
fusal to appropriate funds for the special prosecutor did not violate 
the terms or conditions under which the grant had been awarded.189 
The court apparently reasoned that the proposals contained in the 
state's law enforcement plan did not constitute conditions on the 
183. See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text. 
184. See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text. 
185. 391 A.2d 595 {Pa. 1978). 
186. See Shapp, 391 A.2d at 610 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
187. See Shapp, 391 A.2d at 600-01. 
188. See Shapp, 391 A.2d at 601. 
189. See Shapp, 391 A.2d at 606 ("As long as . . .  the terms and conditions proscribed by 
the Congress are not violated, there is no inconsistency between the provisions of the federal 
programs and state legislative administration of the funds." (emphasis added)). 
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expenditure of federal funds that the state was bound to honor. 
But, as noted above, this is an odd way to regard the state's imple­
mentation plan: there is little point to the plan if it can be casually 
disregarded by the state once the state obtains the money. The 
court also noted that the state constitution required all funds to be 
deposited in the state's general fund and be expended only accord­
ing to an appropriation.19° But this provision - common in state 
constitutions191 - hardly suggests that the legislature's power of 
appropriation should be unlimited by other principles of law - say, 
the state constitution, federal grant conditions, or the governor's 
implementation plan. Finally, the Shapp Court worried that, if the 
legislature could not appropriate federal funds, then the governor 
could "use federal funds to establish and finance one system of 
agencies . . .  without the approval or authorization of the very body 
which is constitutionally empowered to set up and finance state 
plans for education or law enforcement."192 This is certainly a justi­
fiable worry that I discuss below,193 but, again, it is not obvious that 
the legislature can avoid executive tyranny only by ignoring state 
implementation plans. 
Going to the opposite extreme, four state supreme courts have 
held that state legislatures cannot appropriate federal grants at all, 
even in ways that are consistent with the implementation plan sub­
mitted by the governor to the federal agency.194 Such courts reason 
that federal grant revenues are "custodial" funds that are "im­
pressed with a trust" imposed by Congress, a trust with which the 
state legislature cannot interfere.195 
This view that all appropriation must be prohibited is as mis­
guided as the opposite view of Shapp that all appropriation must be 
allowed. The implicit assumption of these decisions seems to be 
that the governor somehow has the exclusive role of ensuring that 
federal grants are spent in compliance with federal conditions. 
Although the state courts are vague about the basis for this doc-
190. See Shapp, 391 A.2d at 600-01. 
191. See infra note 204. 
192. Shapp, 391 A.2d at 605. 
193. See supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text. 
194. See Navajo Tribe v. Arizona Dept. of Admin., 528 P.2d 623 (Ariz. 1975); MacManus 
v. Love, 499 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1972); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 378 N.E.2d 433 
(Mass. 1978); Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974). 
195. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 378 N.E.2d at 436. For a general discussion of the 
decisions' reasoning, see George Brown, Federal Funds and National Supremacy: The Role 
of State Legislatures in Federal Grant Programs, 28 AM. U. L. REv. 279, 288-90 (1979). 
March 1999] Dissecting the State 1265 
trine,196 one might infer that these courts regard the implementa­
tion of Congress's grant conditions as an inherently administrative 
task. By using appropriation to define how the governor must use 
federal funds, the state legislature is, therefore, usurping the gover­
nor's prerogative to control administration of government. The ju­
dicial prohibition on legislative appropriation of federal grants, 
therefore, resembles judicial doctrines barring appropriation meas­
ures that micro-manage executive departments and thereby deprive 
governors or executive agencies of all meaningful discretion in the 
carrying out of legislative instructions.197 
This view of grant administration, however, flatly ignores the 
broad policymaking discretion that Congress bestows on state gov­
ernments when it provides them with federal revenue. One cannot 
deem this discretion to be merely "administrative" discretion be­
cause, in some abstract sense, Congress imposes some general pur­
pose on the federal revenue: Congress's specification of some 
general purpose in the grant legislation - especially block grant 
legislation - leaves enormous room for state policymaking. Thus, 
it is hardly surprising that even state courts that generally bar legis­
lative appropriation of federal gr�ts have not adhered faithfully to 
their own "nonappropriation" doctrine.19s 
The presumption of institutional autonomy provides an alterna­
tive to such rigid and unworkable distinctions between "administra­
tive" and "legislative" tasks. Rather than try to allocate control 
over federal grants according to such formulae, the presumption al­
lows both the legislature and the governor to compete for control 
over such revenue, just so long as each uses the means appropriate 
to its institution. So, for instance, the state legislature has the 
196. For instance, the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated conclusorily that "the [fed­
eral] money is impressed with a trust and is not subject to appropriation by the Legislature." 
Opinion of the Justices, 378 N.E.2d at 436. The court made no effort to explain why the 
legislature would be incapable of carrying out the "trust." 
197. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Arkansas Game & Fish Commn., 757 S.W.2d 950 (Ark. 1988) 
(stating that legislative appropriation for state game and fish commission cannot dictate to 
commission how much money to spend on magazine); Communications Workers of Amer. v. 
Florio, 617 A.2d 223 (N.J. 1992) (holding that state legislature cannot use appropriations to 
define which categories of government employees should be laid off). 
198. See, e.g., Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 738 P.2d 1156 (Colo. 1987) (stating that 
governor has exclusive power to allocate federal grants among programs but legislature has 
exclusive power to transfer portions of block grants between departments). This decision is 
rooted in the Court's earlier decision, Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508 (Colo. 
1985). When confronted with the enormous discretion possessed by state governments in 
managing federal funds, the Colorado Supreme Court has attempted to cabin the implica­
tions of its anti-appropriation doctrine by barring governors from transferring federal block 
grant revenues between different state departments without authorization from the state 
legislature. 
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power to enact substantive legislation prohibiting or requiring par­
ticular elements in the governor's application for federal grants. 
Assuming that the legislature can override the governor's veto, the 
principle of state supremacy provides that such control through 
substantive legislation is the prerogative of the legislature. On the 
other hand, if the state legislature is silent concerning the gover­
nor's application for grants, then the governor should have the pre­
rogative to control the federal grant according to the terms of the 
implementation plan that he or she submitted: in such a case, the 
governor's choices can be deemed "administrative," for they do not 
offend any properly enacted legislative policy but rather fill the 
gaps of legislative silence.199 
Under this theory of competitive joint control, the state legisla­
ture's later appropriation of the federal revenue obtained by the 
governor should not be precluded out of hand. Nor should courts 
attempt to divine some ideal division of responsibility over the 
funds based on some a priori theory of gubernatorial or legislative 
competence. Instead, the appropriation should be evaluated ac­
cording to the plan submitted by the governor. If the plan does not 
leave the decision open, then the appropriation should be enjoined. 
If the plan leaves the choice open, then there is no reason to pre­
clude legislative control. Indeed, such an opportunity for later ap­
propriation gives the federal agency an opportunity to compare the 
governor's "bid" for control of federal revenue with a rival "bid" -
the state legislature's appropriation measure - to decide which 
proposal best advances federal purposes. Such intragovernmental 
competition is not calculated to violate the federal "trust" but 
rather to ensure that state officials more faithfully execute their fed­
eral responsibilities. 
Such a procedural resolution of the clash between the governor 
and state legislature is consistent with the way in which state consti­
tutions normally allocate executive and legislative powers. Rather 
than define which decisions are "administrative," state courts typi­
cally limit legislative interference with governors' decisions by en­
forcing nondelegation doctrines analogous to the Supreme Court's 
199. Such a theory of gubernatorial powers is analogous to the state-law doctrine fol­
lowed in "strong governor" states, like New York, that when the legislature fails to specify 
how revenues are to be allocated, the governor can determine the allocation among sub­
programs. See Alliance for Progress v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Re­
newal, 532 N.Y.S.2d 821 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988); New York Pub. Interest Group v. Carey, 390 
N.Y.S.2d 236 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). 
March 1999] Dissecting the State 1267 
doctrines in INS v. Chadha200 and Bowsher v. Synar:201 they bar 
the state legislature from delegating review of governors' choices to 
special committees or legislative officers.202 Furthermore, the pre­
sumption of institutional autonomy does not prevent the state legis­
lature from forbidding or requiring the governor to apply for 
federal grants in a particular way; rather, the presumption requires 
only that the state legislature exercise such a prerogative in a partic­
ular manner - through substantive legislation or appropriations 
consistent with the state's implementation plan. 
To be sure, such a doctrine limits legislative appropriation of 
federal grants in troubling ways. As Kate Stith has noted, the bar­
ring of any executive expenditure without express appropriation 
forces legislators to oversee executive officials closely so as to pre­
vent unauthorized governmental actions.203 By allowing governors 
to receive federal grants without such appropriation, the presump­
tion of institutional autonomy eliminates such oversight. Of course, 
even if the state legislatures do not appropriate federal grants, Con­
gress does: it is possible that such congressional oversight would 
satisfy the state constitutional requirement that any money with­
drawn from the state treasury be an appropriation "made by law" 
(or words to this effect).204 But even if congressional appropriation 
is legally sufficient, one might doubt whether it is practically effec­
tive at stopping executive abuse: as suggested in section LB, there 
are good reasons to believe that such federal supervision would be 
less effective than supervision by the state legislature. 
Nevertheless, there are at least three reasons to believe that 
such a limit on state legislatures' power of the purse is consistent 
with state constitutional notions of separation of powers. First, the 
governor can achieve such independence from the state legislature 
200. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
201. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
202. See, e.g., General Assembly v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1982); Tucker v. South 
Carolina Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 424 S.E.2d 468 (S.C. 1992) (barring county's 
legislative delegation from exercising legislative veto over governor's highway projects within 
county); West Vrrginia v. Hechler, 462 S.E.2d 586 (W. Va. 1995) (barring legislative veto of 
agency rules). 
203. See Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 91 YALE L.J. 1343, 1356-60 (1988). 
204. See, e.g., A.LA. CONST. art. IV, § 72; A.LA.sKA CONST. art. IX, § 13; ARK. CONST. art. 
V, § 29; CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 7 (West's Ann. 1996). Only two of these clauses - in the 
Constitutions of New Mexico and Delaware - suggest that the "law" in question must be 
enacted by the state legislature rather than by Congress. See DEL. CoNST. art. VIII, § 6 
(requiring appropriation by "Act of the General Assembly"); N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 30 (re­
quiring appropriation by "the legislature"). The practice in both states, however, is not to 
appropriate federal grants. Indeed, the New Mexico Supreme Court seems to bar such ap­
propriation. See New Mexico ex rel Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974). 
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only by submitting an implementation plan that is sufficiently de­
tailed to preclude later state appropriations. If the governor sub­
mits a vague plan to maximize his or her discretion, then the 
legislature's ability to appropriate the grant will not be substantially 
affected, because such appropriations will likely be consistent with 
the nebulous terms of the plan. But governors will likely be reluc­
tant to sacrifice their discretion by submitting an overly detailed 
plan; there are, therefore, political pressures that preserve the legis­
lative power to appropriate the grant revenue. Second, even if the 
governor's plan is extraordinarily detailed, the federal agency may 
choose not to enforce the plan if the later legislative appropriation 
is deemed to be equally consistent with federal policies. Assuming 
that the federal agency has exclusive power to enforce the plan, 
governors will be unable to use the plan to constrain legislative ap­
propriations when the appropriations do not depart substantially 
from federal policies. Third, the state legislature can always bar the 
governor from carrying out policies that the legislature opposes 
simply by enacting substantive legislation that constrains the gover­
nor's ability to apply for federal funds or bars specific gubernatorial 
policies. At most, the presumption of institutional autonomy sim­
ply creates a default rule under which the governor can apply for 
and control federal grant revenue if the state legislature is silent. 
This is a significant power, but it does not free the governor from 
state legislative control if there is a consensus among legislators that 
gubernatorial policies are excessively costly. 
In short, the presumption of institutional autonomy's basic re­
quirement that state legislative appropriations of federal grants 
comply with state implementation plans is probably consistent with 
the best reading of both federal grant programs and most state con­
stitutions. Given the diversity of both federal grants and state con­
stitutions, one must be careful of overgeneralizing.205 Neverthe­
less, to the extent that any generalization is possible, the presump­
tion seems consistent with federal and state law. 
The more difficult issue is how to remedy legislative departures 
from the state's implementation plan. Should the court enjoin the 
illegal appropriations measure and allocate the federal grant as a 
lump-sum appropriation to the governor? Or should the court in­
stead simply withhold some percentage of federal funds? The arti-
205. For instance, in states with traditions of strong gubernatorial offices - such as New 
Jersey and New York - the limit on state legislative appropriation may seem trivial. In 
states like Colorado, where the governor has few powers over the budget, the limitation may 
be more significant. 
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cle has already noted that, as a matter of policy, the remedy of 
injunction is crucial: without it, the federal agency's power to en­
force the state's implementation plan could be an empty power, as 
few federal agencies would withdraw federal funds from noncom­
plying state legislatures. But why is such a remedy consistent with 
the prevailing doctrines governing grant programs? The withhold­
ing of the federal revenue might be a more legally appropriate sanc­
tion, given that the state has no obligation to participate in the 
federal scheme at all - and, indeed, has a constitutional entitle­
ment not to participate. 
The short answer to this question is that the Court has fre­
quently enforced conditions on federal grants simply by enjoining 
state laws inconsistent with those conditions.206 In effect, such a 
remedy is analogous to the remedy of specific performance in the 
context of breach of private contracts. One might argue that having 
accepted the federal funds, the state is obliged to carry out its part 
of the intergovernmental bargain and not merely provide restitu­
tion of the money that it accepted.207 But, as with Lawrence 
County, this answer is a bit unsatisfactory: the contractual analogy 
is problematic, because the governor rather than the state legisla­
ture accepted federal funds. Why, then should the legislature's 
appropriations measure be set aside to accommodate the guber­
natorial plan that the legislature never approved? 
To resolve this question, one should look to the purpose of a 
legislative appropriation. Using the terminology laid out in section 
II.A.1, one might ask whether the appropriation of federal grants is 
intended to be regulatory or revenue-enhancing. The principle of 
state supremacy guarantees to the legislature the power to escape 
conditions attached to federal funds by forgoing those funds. 
Therefore, if the state legislature intends to withdraw from a federal 
grant program by appropriating the funds in ways inconsistent with 
the state's own implementation plan, then the proper remedy would 
be simply to deprive the state of the grant. This, however, would be 
an odd way to interpret a measure appropriating a federal grant: 
the very point of an appropriations measure is to retain federal 
money, not abandon it. If the legislature were actually confronted 
206. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
207. In cases where the state legislature has agreed to participate in a federal program 
but has failed to appropriate either federal grant revenue or state matching funds, state 
courts have occasionally argued that the state legislature is obliged to appropriate the neces­
sary revenue. See Coalition For Basic Human Needs v. King, 654 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1981); 
Kimble v. Solomon, 599 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1979); Knoll v. White, 595 A.2d 665 (Pa. Commw. 
1991). 
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with the choice of seeing the state lose the federal grant altogether 
or foregoing its power to appropriate the grant, the state legislature 
might choose the latter alternative. If so, the remedy most consis­
tent with state legislative intent would be to ignore the 
appropriation. 
Given the ambiguity of appropriations measures, the ideal rem­
edy would help clarify whether the legislature intends to withdraw 
from the federal program and forgo federal funds when it appropri­
ates grant revenue in ways inconsistent with the state's own plan. 
But this consideration suggests that withholding grant revenue is a 
poor sanction with which to enforce state implementation plans. 
The problem with such a remedy is that, as explained in section 
II.A, it is so draconian that it would likely deter both governors and 
federal agencies from filing lawsuits to enforce the state implemen­
tation plans. After all, the withholding of federal revenue would 
damage the very program that the federal agency is trying to ad­
vance. The court would, in effect, destroy the state's implementa­
tion plan in the course of enforcing it. This possibility might 
encourage canny legislatures to appropriate federal grants in ways 
inconsistent with the state's plan, in hopes that the federal agency 
would be deterred from challenging the noncompliance by the se­
verity of the sanction. In short, far from helping to clarify the state 
legislature's intentions, the sanction of withholding federal funds 
might actually encourage state legislatures to conceal strategically 
their willingness to comply with the terms under which federal reve­
nue is awarded to the state. 
By contrast, the remedy of awarding the grant directly to the 
governor free from the state legislature's appropriation would elim­
inate the federal agency's and the governor's disincentive to en­
force the implementation plan. Such a remedy does not force the 
state legislature to participate in the federal program against its 
will: if the legislature wishes to withdraw from the federal program, 
then it can do so with substantive legislation barring the governor 
from applying for or accepting the federal grant. 
In sum, allowing the federal government to dissect the state in 
the administration of federal grant programs has some advantages. 
By playing local governments off against the state, or the governor 
off against the state legislature, the federal agency can reduce the 
possibility that any nonfederal officer responsible for federal pro­
grams will violate the terms of their intergovernmental agreement. 
Such dissection need not violate the principle of state supremacy, 
just so long as state lawmakers designated by the state constitution 
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can ultimately refuse to participate in some scheme of cooperative 
federalism. The presumption of institutional autonomy defended 
here only limits the needless centralization of the state to ensure 
that, absent the clear command of state law, federal agencies will be 
able to take advantage of comp�tition for federal revenue between 
state and local officials. 
III. CONSTRUING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' POWERS TO Acr AS 
FEDERAL AGENTS 
Federal grant programs are not the only context in which the 
federal government dissects the state. Controversies about whether 
and how federal law can liberate state or local officials from the 
constraints of state law arise whenever federal law authorizes 
nonfederal officials to undertake actions that are unauthorized by 
state law. As argued in section I.B, when state law unambiguously 
prohibits the actions, then the principle of state supremacy bars 
such actions. The question, however, is more difficult when state 
authorization is ambiguous. Some state-law doctrines such as Dil­
lon's Rule208 would suggest that, absent express state authorization, 
the local officials' action ought to be barred. Should such doctrines 
apply to official action that is expressly authorized by federal law 
when state law authorization is ambiguous? 
In this final Part of this article, I examine two controversies in­
volving such ambiguity: first, the dispute between the City of 
Tacoma and the State of Washington over the City's construction of 
a dam that would flood the State's fish hatchery,209 and second, the 
State of Connecticut's efforts to prevent the City of Bridgeport 
from filing for bankruptcy under Chapter IX of the federal bank­
ruptcy statute.210 In both of the controversies, the cities success­
fully invoked federal law to preempt state laws or policies limiting 
their discretion. I argue that these results make sense, because nar­
row construction of local governments' powers are inappropriate 
when the federal government has authorized local action. This is 
not to say that the state legislature should not be able to veto such 
federal-local cooperation. One can argue on the basis of both pol­
icy and doctrine, however, that local officials should be presump­
tively entitled to implement federal law just so long as state law 
does not expressly forbid the local action. 
208. See infra note 222. 
209. For the complex series of decisions, see supra note 19. 
210. In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991). 
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A. Federal Authorization for Municipal Projects That 
Impose Spillover Costs Outside the Municipality: 
The City of Tacoma's Dam and 
Other Unneighborly Behavior 
In 1948, the City of Tacoma applied to the Federal Power Com­
mission for a license to build two dams on the Cowlitz River, a trib­
utary of the Columbia. The two dams were significant projects.211 
But the smaller dam (measuring 240 feet above bedrock) caused 
the most controversy, because it would flood a salmon hatchery 
owned by the State of Washington. Accordingly, the Washington 
State Fish and Game Departments, represented by the State 
Attorney General, intervened before the Federal Power Commis­
sion to oppose the City's application for a license. The State argued 
that Washington's statutes required Tacoma to obtain permission 
from the State to construct any dam storing more than ten acre­
feet. Moreover, state law also prohibited the construction of any 
dam over twenty-five feet high if the dam would block the migra­
tion of anadromous fish. Finally, the State argued that Tacoma sim­
ply lacked the power to condemn the State's hatchery by flooding 
it, because state law did not confer upon cities the power to con­
demn state-owned land already dedicated to a public use.212 
The Federal Power Commission disagreed in an opinion that 
was later upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
and affirmed by the Supreme Court.213 To the Ninth Circuit, the 
case presented a simple matter of the supremacy of federal law over 
state law: since Gibbons v. Ogden, it was well settled that state law 
could not interfere with the rights of a federal licensee to exercise 
the rights provided by a federal license on a navigable watenvay.214 
The Ninth Circuit conceded that the City of Tacoma was a creature 
of the State that normally could not act without authorization from 
state law. The court of appeals noted, however, that private licen­
sees could invoke federal law to preempt state law inconsistent with 
the federal license, even when the private licensee - an electrical 
co-op - was arguably a creature of state law.215 The court of ap-
211. The combined cost of the two dams would equal $146 million and generate 465,000 
kilowatts of power. The larger dam measured 510 feet from the bedrock and was expected to 
inundate 10,000 acres of land as far as 21 miles upstream. See State of Washington Dept. of 
Game v. Federal Power Commn., 207 F.2d 391, 393 (9th Cir. 1953); City of Tacoma I, supra 
note 4, 262 P.2d at 216-17 (Wash. 1953). 
212. See State of Washington Dept. of Game, 207 F.2d at 395. 
213. See State of Washington Dept. of Game, 207 F.2d at 398. 
214. See State of Washington Dept. of Game, 207 F.2d at 396. 
215. See State of Washington Dept. of Game, 207 F.2d at 396. 
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peals apparently saw no reason to distinguish between municipal 
and private corporations. 
While the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, the Washington 
Supreme Court got an opportunity to revisit the issue: the City 
filed an action in state court seeking a declaration that the City's 
revenue bonds :financing the dams' construction were valid. The 
State contested the action on largely the same grounds that it raised 
before the FPC, and, after procedural maneuvers too tedious to re­
count, the Washington Supreme Court agreed with the State, hold­
ing that the State had not conferred the power to condemn the 
hatcheries upon the City and that the FPC's effort to confer such 
powers on a city would constitute "a momentous and novel" trans­
formation of constitutional federalism.216 The State's victory, how­
ever, was short-lived: the Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
held that the Washington Supreme Court's decision was barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata, as the issue of municipal power had 
already been litigated before the Ninth Circuit.217 
On its surface, therefore, the Tacoma case presents an admira­
bly clear conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the Washington 
Supreme Court concerning the principle of state supremacy: the 
Ninth Circuit apparently rejected the principle, while the Washing­
ton Supreme Court embraced it, and the federal tribunal won be­
cause its decision came first. But a closer examination of the case 
suggests more ambiguous reasoning: the Ninth Circuit's opinion 
can be read not so much as rejecting outright the idea of state 
supremacy over local governments, but rather as qualifying this 
principle with a presumption of local autonomy, a presumption that 
makes eminent sense as a matter of doctrine and policy. 
To understand the Tacoma case, it is crucial to realize that the 
case was about how to construe the state legislature's silence. 
Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Washington Supreme Court held 
that any state law expressly prohibited the City of Tacoma from 
building its proposed dams. To be sure, the Fish Sanctuary Act pro­
hibited all dams that blocked the migrations of salmon.218 But even 
the Washington Supreme Court agreed that this state statute was 
not intended to govern dams approved by the Federal Power Com­
mission.219 The real difference of opinion between the Washington 
216. See City of Tacoma II, supra note 19, 307 P.2d at 577. 
217. See City of Tacoma Iv, supra note 19, 357 U.S. at 341. 
218. See City of Tacoma I, supra note 4, 262 P.2d at 218. 
219. The Washington Supreme Court reasoned that this state law did not prevent private 
utilities from constructing a dam if the private utility held a federal license to construct the 
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Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit rested on whether the 
Federal Power Commission could bestow the power to condemn 
state-owned land on the City of Tacoma even though state statutes 
were _silent on the question of whether the City possessed this 
power. 
The Washington Supreme Court started from the premise that 
"[a] municipal corporation does not have an inherent power of emi­
nent domain" and can exercise such a power "only when it is ex­
pressly authorized to do so by the state legislature. "220 The court 
then concluded that the City of Tacoma lacked the power to con­
demn the State's fish hatchery, because no state statute expressly 
provided cities with the power to condemn state-owned land. The 
court also addressed what it called "the subsidiary question" of 
whether federal legislation could bestow eminent domain powers 
on the City of Tacoma, even if state law did not do so. In a curi­
ously conclusory opinion, the Court asserted that "[t]he Federal 
government may not confer corporate capacity upon local units of 
government beyond the capacity given them by their creator," be­
cause allowing cities to exercise federally derived powers would 
"relegate a sovereign state to a position of impotence never con­
templated by the framers of our constitutions, state and Federal."221 
The Washington Supreme Court's view that cities could not ex­
ercise powers of eminent domain without express state authoriza­
tion is not novel: it is merely a narrower version of Dillon's rule -
the rule that the powers bestowed on municipalities by state legisla­
tures ought to be narrowly construed.222 Moreover, one can argue 
dam: the state law would be preempted by the federal license governing a navigable water­
way. The issue, then, was whether the Fish Sanctuary Act should be construed to prohibit 
municipal dams even if federal law preempted its application to private dams. As the dis­
senters on the Washington Supreme Court noted, this was a state-law question of severabil­
ity, a question that even a majority of the Washington Supreme Court answered in favor of 
the City: according to the state supreme court, there was no indication in the Fish Sanctuary 
Act that the state legislature intended to place municipalities in a position inferior to private 
utilities, by stripping them of powers that the private utilities would continue to enjoy. See 
City of Tacoma I, supra note 4, 262 P.2d at 229. Both courts reasoned that, if the Fish Sanctu­
ary Act was preempted as to private entities, then purely as a matter of state law, it ought to 
be preempted as to municipalities as well. 
220. City of Tacoma II, supra note 19, 307 P.2d at 575. 
221. City of Tacoma II, supra note 19, 307 P.2d at 577. 
222. Dillon's Rule was first formulated by Judge John Dillon, sitting on the Iowa 
Supreme Court in City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. R.R., 24 Iowa 455 {1868). Dillon 
incorporated the rule in his 1872 treatise on municipal corporations, stating that: 
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses 
and can exercise the following powers and no others: Frrst, those granted in express 
words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly 
granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and pur­
poses of the corporation. 
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that such a narrow construction of municipal power makes sense as 
a matter of policy as well as doctrine. The vast majority of munici­
palities govern relatively small territorial jurisdictions and therefore 
have both the capacity and incentive to impose external costs on 
nonresidents immediately outside their sharply circumscribed 
boundaries. The City of Tacoma, for instance, has an incentive to 
construct hydroelectric plants to benefit their own residents even if 
these plants destroy fish populations enjoyed by nonresident sports­
persons, the fishing industry, and environmentalists.223 
Given these well-known dangers of spillover costs, it makes 
sense to require some larger jurisdiction - say, the state legislature 
- to monitor municipal actions and ensure that they are not efforts 
to exploit nonresidents or internal minorities. Dillon's rule and 
analogous doctrines serve such a purpose: they require state legis­
latures to review each category of municipal action and expressly 
authorize it. Of course, such broad rules tend to be crude: they do 
not isolate the particular types of municipal actions that tend to re­
sult in the greatest injustice. But there is no easy way to define 
these actions with judicially manageable rules. Absent such a defi­
nition, there is a plausible argument that no local government ought 
to be permitted to undertake a category of governmental action un­
til the state legislature has reviewed the category to ensure that the 
action will not impose unnecessary costs on outsiders.224 So, for 
instance, there is a sensible argument for barring the City of Ta­
coma from condemning a state-owned fish hatchery until the state 
legislature expressly approves such condemnations of state-owned 
property. One simply cannot trust local governments to protect 
nonresidents when they condemn state facilities designed to benefit 
JOHN DILLON, CoMMENTARIES ON TiiE LAWS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § '237 (5th ed. 
1911). For a discussion of the role that the rule continues to play in city government, see 
Richard Briffault, Our Localism (pt. I), 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 8 (1990). 
223. Indeed, the laws governing the incorporation of municipalities tend to allow the pro­
miscuous creation of municipal corporations even when such incorporation gravely injures 
the welfare of persons who are carved out of the cities' boundaries by the incorporators. 
224. For a different defense of Dillon's Rule in terms of policy, see Clayton P. Gillette, In 
Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 
67 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 959 (1991). Professor Gillette argues that Dillon's Rule is not well­
designed to prevent external costs, as it does not distinguish between municipal actions that 
impose such costs and those that do not I suggest, however, that there will tend to be a high 
correlation between those activities that municipalities have clearest authority to perform 
based on state statute and tradition, and those activities that are least likely to impose exter­
nal costs. To the extent that a municipality has performed some function uncontroversially 
for centuries, it is likely that the activity is one the municipality is well-suited to perform. 
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nonresidents until the state legislature has some opportunity to con­
sider the issue.225 
But this conventional argument against local autonomy does not 
resolve the question at issue in Tacoma. The issue is not whether 
cities ought to be able to exercise novel powers solely on their own 
initiative and without state authorization. Rather, the issue is 
whether the federal government (in the form of the Federal Power 
Commission) ought to be permitted to delegate powers to munici­
palities without state authorization. The Washington Supreme 
Court did not need to trust the City of Tacoma to police itself: it 
need only trust the Federal Power Commission to police the City of 
Tacoma. 
There are three reasons why one might sensibly allow the fed­
eral government to delegate powers to municipalities without ex­
press state authorization, even though one might not allow 
municipalities to exercise such powers on their own initiative. First, 
because the powers must be delegated by either Congress or some 
federal agency, burdened nonresidents have an opportunity to pro­
tect themselves from the municipal action by lobbying federal offi­
cials. Unlike municipal politicians, federal officials receive their 
revenue and jurisdiction from Congress, the members of which are 
elected from both residents and nonresidents of municipalities. 
Nonresidents, therefore, have a preliminary line of defense against 
municipal governments' attempting to use a federal delegation of 
power to impose spillover costs on nonresidents: they can ask their 
congressperson to raise objections with the appropriate federal 
agency. 
So, for instance, when the City of Chicago entered into an inter­
state compact with Gary, Indiana, to build an airport, the project 
came under fire from Representative Henry Hyde, a senior repre­
sentative of Illinois suburbanites who would be affected by the 
noise from the proposed airport's runways.226 Chicago's mayor, 
Richard Daley, cannily entered into the interstate compact with 
Gary because such a compact would be protected by federal law 
from being revoked by the Illinois State Legislature: in effect, 
225. The Washington legislature arguably had not had such an opportunity. The Wash­
ington Supreme Court had held that cities could condemn state-owned property when such 
property was not currently being used by the state for some public purpose. But the court 
had never suggested that cities could condemn state-owned property actively used by the 
state. See City of Tacoma v. State, 209 P. 700, 701 (Wash. 1922); Roberts v. City of Seattle, 
116 P. 25 (Wash. 1911). 
226. See Henry J. Hyde, Letter to the Editor, Daley's Airport Gambit Won't Fly, CHI. 
TRIB., May 24, 1995. 
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Daley hoped to use federal law to liberate Chicago from the con­
straints of the (Republican- and suburb-dominated) state govem­
ment.227 But, because Congress would have to approve such a 
compact, Daley would not be able to impose costs on the suburbs 
without at least some oversight by a legislative body - Congress -
that, in the form of Henry Hyde, represented those suburbs. This is 
not to say that such federal oversight is perfect. Indeed, as noted in 
section I.B, the premise underlying the principle of state supremacy 
is that such oversight is inadequate. Nevertheless, when cities exer­
cise delegated federal powers, they exercise powers that have been 
screened and debated by the federal representatives of affected 
nonresidents. This reduces (but does not eliminate) the possibility 
that nonresidents will be unjustly injured. 
There is a second reason to permit local governments to exer­
cise such federally derived powers without express state authoriza­
tion: there is greater need, because the federal government might 
need the assistance of the state's subdivisions to prevent the state 
itself from imposing interstate spillover effects on persons outside 
the state. The federal government, after all, has the constitutional 
authority to delegate regulatory powers to cities generally because 
such powers address some "substantial effect" that crosses state 
boundaries - say, the regulation of interstate waterways or the cre­
ation of airports serving interstate travelers.228 If the federal gov­
ernment could not make use of municipalities for such purposes 
until the state legislature expressly authorized such use, then the 
state government's indifference to effects felt outside the state's 
boundaries could foreclose federal-local bargains: sheer legislative 
inertia might prevent the required state authorization for federal­
local action from ever emerging, even when the external costs of 
local action were small.229 
227. For an overview of the controversy over Daley's effort to protect Chicago's pro­
posed airport from state oversight, see Karen Pierog, Chicago, Gary, Ind., Want Illinois Law­
suit Thrown Out, BoND BUYER, Aug. 31, 1995, at 5. Illinois's efforts to bar the Gary-Chicago 
pact through litigation failed when Federal District Dourt Judge Leinenweber ruled that the 
plaintiff, the state of Illinois, failed to state a federal claim and lacked standing. See Illinois 
ex rel Edgar v. Chicago, 942 F. Supp. 366, 373-74 (N.D. m. 1996). 
228. The most commonly invoked justification for Congress's regulatory power is the 
need for federal regulation of activities that impose costs - "substantial effects" - outside 
the jurisdiction of the state in which they occur, making regulation of the activities by individ­
ual states impractical. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
229. So, for instance, in opposing the proposed airport of the City of Chicago, the State of 
Illinois might not have been motivated exclusively by a desire to prevent the City from im­
posing external costs of noise on the suburbs. It might also have been motivated by a less 
benign desire to exercise exclusive control over the patronage provided by construction con­
tracts and jobs. 
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Of course, the federal government could stimulate legislative in­
terest in the proposed enabling legislation by offering federal 
grants-in-aid to state governments that provide the necessary au­
thorization to their municipalities. As noted above in section II.A, 
state legislatures and governors might act strategically in response 
to such offers: they might misrepresent the costs of complying with 
federal requests in hopes of reaping a larger amount of federal 
grant revenue for themselves. As suggested in section II.B, legal 
doctrines, such as Dillon's Rule, that centralize state government 
can be expected to exacerbate this tendency toward strategic behav­
ior, because such doctrines reduce the intergovernmental competi­
tion between state and local governments. Such competition gives 
the federal government alternative routes with which to implement 
federal law, depriving any nonfederal institution of a "lock" on 
nonfederal personnel and policymaking capacity. A default rule 
that deprives local governments of the power to act as federal 
agents absent express state authorization gives state legislatures 
precisely such a monopoly over their local governments. 
By giving municipalities a presumptive power to carry out fed­
eral policies, the default rule proposed here would mitigate this 
danger of overcentralization of state government. This is not to say 
that the presumption would prevent the state government from bar­
ring local governments from carrying out federal programs. But 
such centralization would be much more difficult to achieve: it 
would require the state legislature to enact a statute rather than 
simply to block a statute from being enacted. There are good rea­
sons to believe that the municipalities within a state would find it 
easier to lobby to preserve the powers that they presumptively have 
than to obtain new powers that are presumptively denied to 
them.230 By giving municipalities a presumptive right to act as fed­
eral agents, the presumption of institutional autonomy would place 
preservation of the federal government's access to a state's local 
governments on the agenda of both the state legislature and the 
state's municipal lobbying organization: the default rule might well 
create an incentive among a state's municipalities to join together 
to preserve an existing power even if they would not exert the same 
effort to obtain such a power with a new statute. Such a default 
rule, in short, makes it easier for the federal government to mobil­
ize local governments as proxies for federal interests - a goal that 
230. For such an argument, see Samuel lssacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, ls Age Dis­
crimination Really Age Discrimination?: The ADEA's Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 780, 808-09 (1997). 
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may produce significant efficiencies by giving the federal govern­
ment multiple nonfederal institutions from which to seek assistance. 
The presumption that local governments can serve federal inter­
ests serves a third purpose: it acts as a "penalty default," giving 
state legislatures an incentive to resolve political disputes about the 
costs of local action.231 State legislatures may have an incentive to 
avoid political controversies that pit suburbanites against city resi­
dents, because any resolution of such struggles invariably entails 
electoral risk for at least some state legislators. In order to avoid 
this risk, the state legislature may simply adopt a posture of inaction 
on the theory that adherence to the status quo will have less chance 
of arousing voter hostility. This incentive, however, may prevent 
the best decisionmaker from squarely addressing contentious con­
flicts that require resolution: there are good reasons to believe that 
the state legislature is the institution best suited for resolving such 
struggles. This institutional fact, indeed, is what justifies the princi­
ple of state supremacy in the first place. 
It is useful, therefore, to give the state legislature an incentive to 
deliberate (or bargain) about conflicts between residents of differ­
ent local governments. A default rule allowing local governments' 
action can provide such an incentive, simply because such a rule 
disrupts interest groups' settled expectations that might otherwise 
be protected through legislative passivity. Interest groups that ben­
efit from the status quo have an incentive to lobby the state legisla­
ture to prevent the local government's action, while municipalities 
(and the interest groups who control them) have an incentive to 
preserve the powers bestowed upon them by the default rule. For 
instance, the decision in the Tacoma case gives environmentalists, 
sport fishing groups, and others interested in salmon hatcheries an 
incentive to clarify the rules governing .local governments' powers 
to construct hydroelectric plants: rather than rely on a combination 
of legislative silence and Dillon's Rule to control the spillover costs 
of utilities, they must lobby for a specific statute detailing the types 
of municipal actions that they find objectionable. To the extent that 
one believes that the state legislature should actively engage in de­
bate to resolve such issues, a default rule that allows local govern-
231. Penalty default rules are rules construing contractual terms against the interest of 
the person most capable of changing the rules even when such a construction is inefficient 
because the parties would bargain for a different rule. The function of the penalty default is 
to give the person most capable of changing the rule an incentive to reveal his or her prefer­
ences. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 95-107 (1989). 
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ments to alter the status quo might best promote such active 
debate. 
For these three reasons, a court might favor a default rule pro­
moting local governments' autonomy to serve as agents of the fed­
eral government even if the court would not adopt such a rule when 
the local government acted purely on its own initiative. These con­
siderations do not, of course, establish such a default rule as a good 
idea. They suggest, however, that the Washington Supreme Court 
committed a logical non sequitur in inferring that the City of 
Tacoma could not act as a federal licensee from the rule that the 
City lacked sufficient state authorization to act without federal au­
thorization. State law might well adopt different default rules for 
local power depending on whether or not the local government ac­
ted pursuant to a federal delegation of power. There is nothing le­
gally bizarre about doctrines that allow local governments to 
exercise powers pursuant to intergovernmental contracts that such 
governments would not be permitted to exercise by themselves. 
The so-called "power of one" doctrine, for instance, permits local 
governments to engage in activities pursuant to intergovernmental 
agreements that such governments would be barred from exercising 
on their own initiative.232 The presumption of institutional auton­
omy is an analogous "power of one" doctrine for federal-local 
relations. 
B. Federal Authorization for Municipal Adjustment of Bonded 
Indebtedness: The Case of Bridgeport's Bankruptcy 
Like federal licenses to construct dams or airports, municipal 
bankruptcy also raises the issue of how the federal government can 
dissect the state. Section 109(c)(2) of the federal bankruptcy law 
provides that local governments can file a petition seeking protec­
tion from their creditors - but only if the local government is "gen­
erally authorized" to do so under state law. Bridgeport's 1991 
petition for bankruptcy illustrates how contentious this question of 
general authorization can be. Over the objection of the 
Connecticut government, the federal bankruptcy court held that the 
Connecticut State Assembly's general delegation of power to its cit­
ies to sue or be sued sufficed to provide Bridgeport with the requi­
site authorization. Thus, like the Ninth Circuit in Tacoma, the 
232. See AnvisoRY CoMMN. ON lNTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, lNTERGOVERNMEN· 
TAL SERVICE ARRANGEMENTS FOR DELIVERING LoCAL PuBLIC SERVICES: UPDATE 1983, at 
9 (1985); CHARLES SANDS ET AL., LoCAL GOVERNMENT LAW §§ 6.04, 18.11 (1981); see also 
Goreham v. Des Moines Metro. Area Solid Waste Agency, 179 N.W.2d 449, 455 (Iowa 1970). 
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bankruptcy court generously construed the municipality's power to 
act pursuant to federal law, effectively allowing Bridgeport to use 
federal law to resist the will of the state government. 
Did the bankruptcy court err in such a generous construction of 
Bridgeport's powers? The question illustrates the statutory ambi­
guity endemic to the issue. On one hand, as Michael McConnell 
and Randall Picker note, the state statutory framework at issue in 
Bridgeport arguably suggested that the state government intended 
to occupy the field of municipal debt relief and to preclude munici­
pal resort to federal legislation.233 Because Bridgeport's govern­
ment had proved incapable of making the politically difficult 
taxation and expenditure decisions necessary to curb the City's debt 
burden, the Connecticut State Assembly had created a special 
agency - the Bridgeport Financial Review Board - to monitor 
the City's fiscal decisions, restore the beleaguered city to fiscal sta­
bility, and ensure that the City paid off its accumulated debt. To­
ward this end, the State Assembly granted the Board wide-ranging 
powers to limit the City's fiscal autonomy: the City was required to 
submit its budgets to the Board and, if the budget did not meet the 
requirements of the state legislation, then the Board was authorized 
to reject the budget and promulgate its own budget for the City.234 
It is certainly a plausible construction of this statutory scheme that 
Connecticut implicitly intended to bar municipal debt avoidance 
through resort to federal bankruptcy law - after all, the point of 
the state statute was to pay off municipal debts, not default on 
them.235 
On the other hand, one also can reasonably argue that the State 
Assembly's silence on the question of whether Bridgeport had the 
power to file under Chapter Nine suggests that the City retained 
the power to file its petition. Indeed, the State Assembly consid­
ered a statute expressly barring such petitions, but the statute was 
not enacted.236 While one must be cautious about drawing ambi­
tious inferences from such failure to enact legislation, there is no 
obvious reason to believe that a consensus existed in the Connecti­
cut General Assembly to forbid Bridgeport from filing a Chapter 
233. See Michael W. McConnell & Randall C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Concep­
tual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 425, 460 (1993). 
234. For a useful statement of the facts in the Bridgeport case, see Dorothy A. Brown, 
Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case Study in Re­
claiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 625 (1995). 
235. See, e.g., McConnell & Picker, supra note 233, at 458-61. 
236. See Rachael E. Schwartz, This Way to the Egress: Should Bridgeport's Chapter 9 
Filing Have Been Dismissed?, 66 AM. BANKR. LJ. 103, 127 (1992). 
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Nine petition. This statutory silence is not peculiar to Connecticut: 
only seventeen states have expressly authorized petitions under 
Chapter Nine, and only one state (Georgia) has ever expressly pro­
hibited such petitions.237 
The important question under section 209(c)(2), therefore, is 
how to construe such silence. The presumption of institutional au­
tonomy defended in this article sheds some light on this general 
question. Contrary to the views of McConnell and Picker, it sug­
gests that the Bridgewater Court's ruling makes sense as a matter of 
policy, for the same reasons that such a presumption might be a 
sensible way to resolve the controversy in Tacoma. 
As with municipal eminent domain, it is important to distinguish 
between federally authorized municipal actions and municipal ac­
tions that the local government takes on its own initiative. There 
are respectable reasons to construe narrowly a municipality's power 
to avoid its debts when federal authorization is absent, because 
there is a danger that cities will use a broad power to impose exter­
nal costs on nonresidents. The external costs of projects like dams 
and airports are easy to see: as noted above, they can generate 
noise, flooding of ecosystems, and loss of valuable fish populations. 
But municipal bankruptcy filings also can impose external costs: 
one city's filing can increase the borrowing costs for other munici­
palities within the same state, as bond purchasers become wary that 
other cities might follow the defaulting city's example. Just as state 
governments representing all municipalities within its boundaries 
may be more likely to consider the costs suffered by persons resid­
ing outside the condemning municipality, so too, the state may have 
a greater incentive to consider the creditworthiness of the state's 
municipalities as a whole. 
But two reasons suggest that these considerations apply with 
less force when the federal government has authorized the adjust­
ment of municipal debt. First, such federal authorization suggests 
that municipal debt relief will impose fewer costs on unrepresented 
interests: as with federal licensing of dam construction, the federal 
government's oversight provides some modest assurance that the 
municipality will not impose external costs on neighboring cities. 
Congress, after all, represents bondholders and other public credi­
tors, such as public employee unions, as well as other public bond 
issuers who might fear that one city's default would injure their own 
creditworthiness. 
237. See id. at 122 n.107. 
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Indeed, Congress might be better suited to regulate municipal 
debt than the state legislature. Given that municipal bonds are 
traded on a national market, state legislatures might undervalue the 
costs of default on municipal obligations: after all, the costs of such 
default would be broadly spread among debtors and creditors 
throughout the nation while the benefits would be concentrated 
among the state's municipalities. Therefore, one might argue that, 
to ensure the marketability of municipal bonds throughout the na­
tional market, it is essential that there be a federal law protecting 
the interests of creditors and adjusting municipal debts in an or­
derly fashion.238 
Second, as with municipal dams or airports, federal authoriza­
tion of municipal debt adjustment may be a useful way to prevent 
the state government from abusing its power over local politics for 
partisan reasons. As argued in section I.B, state governments are 
better suited for monitoring and supervising their municipalities 
than the federal government. There is nevertheless a significant 
risk that state officials will misuse their control over local govern­
ments to maximize their own opportunities for patronage or rent­
seeking. The facts of Bridgeport illustrate this danger. The immedi­
ate motivation for Bridgeport's Chapter Nine petition was the Fi­
nancial Review Board's insistence that the City of Bridgeport raise 
property taxes by eighteen percent to cover the costs of the City's 
collective bargaining agreements. The City invoked Chapter Nine 
largely to obtain an automatic stay of all litigation regarding its con­
tracts with its public employee unions - especially litigation con­
cerning the Board's order to raise taxes. 
On the surface, one might view such state oversight as benign: 
the State was sternly demanding that the City honor its obligations 
and exercise fiscal responsibility, while the City was apparently cast 
in the role of the prodigal municipality, using bankruptcy law to 
avoid making politically tough decisions to increase taxes. The 
facts, however, could bear another interpretation. Occurring only 
six months before the mayoral elections, the Board's tax hike would 
jeopardize the chances of Bridgeport's Republican Mayor, Mary 
Moran, to win reelection. This effect may not have been an acci­
dent. The Board was composed exclusively of Democrats who had 
little political incentive to see Moran reelected: they might have 
238. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in 
the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REv. 
267, 286 (1988) (explaining why the Contract Clause limits power of state legislatures but not 
power of Congress). 
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insisted on the tax increase to ensure the downfall of a political 
rival. This interpretation of the Board's action is suggested by one 
piece of circumstantial evidence: when Moran was defeated and a 
Democratic mayor was elected, the Board dropped its insistence on 
a property tax hike and simply made up the City's shortfall with 
state assistance.239 
In short, it is unclear whether the Financial Review Board's op­
position to Bridgeport's petition was judicious state intervention to 
alleviate local fiscal irresponsibility or partisan manipulation that 
exacerbated Bridgeport's fiscal distress. The presumption of insti­
tutional autonomy provides a useful way to resolve such uncertain­
ties: by presumptively allowing Bridgeport to take advantage of 
federal law, the default rule gives rival interest groups an incentive 
to lobby the state legislature and provoke debate on how best to 
address municipal debt crises. If there were a genuine danger that 
Bridgeport's efforts at debt adjustment would endanger municipal 
creditworthiness, then Connecticut's bondholders, underwriters, 
public employee unions, and suburban municipalities could be en­
listed to bar Chapter Nine petitions. On the other hand, if the 
Board opposed Bridgeport's petition simply for reasons of partisan 
advantage, then the absence of any public-regarding reason for op­
posing debt adjustment under federal law would presumably make 
it more difficult to assemble a coalition sufficient to limit municipal 
power. Placing the burden of changing the status quo on the oppo­
nents of municipal debt adjustment might provide a sensible "pen­
alty default," if only because such opponents will, more likely than 
not, predominate in the state legislature and have the greatest abil­
ity to clarify the law. 
In short, the result in Bridgeport can be justified by considera­
tions similar to the arguments provided in relation to Tacoma. In 
either case, it might be sensible to presume that municipalities can 
act pursuant to federal authorization because (1) the need for state 
oversight is somewhat reduced by the presence of federal oversight, 
and (2) the dangers of excessive state centralization might best be 
mitigated by a default rule requiring the state legislature to specify 
why the federal government's empowerment of local government is 
inefficient. Such a presumption does not overturn the state govern­
ment's ultimate power to allocate power among its municipalities. 
But it encourages the state government to exercise such power with 
239. See Brown, supra note 234, at 637. 
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greater regard for the federal government's interests in municipal 
autonomy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The presumption of institutional autonomy and the principle of 
state supremacy together define an uneasy balance between 
Congress's need to dissect the state into competing nonfederal insti­
tutions and the rival need to ensure that nonfederal institutions re­
main under the control of state law. On one hand, state lawmakers 
- including state constitutional draftspersons - are best situated 
to develop institutions for local governance: they ought to have the 
final word in creating such institutions. On the other hand, the fed­
eral government often needs to< use such institutions: presuming 
that such institutions maintain their independence and can compete 
with each other to act as agents of Congress helps protect the fed­
eral government's access to these institutions. 
In effect, the presumption of institutional autonomy operates as 
a "plain statement" rule: it does not prevent the state government 
from asserting control over nonfederal governmental institutions 
but simply demands that such assertions be accompanied by a plain 
statement of the evil that such control is intended to avert. So, for 
instance, in the context of federal grants-in-aid, the state legislature 
cannot simply appropriate funds initially awarded by the federal 
government to local governments and governors. Instead, the state 
legislature must describe the categories of local or executive action 
that it regards as harmful and bar those actions. Likewise, the state 
legislature cannot preclude local governments from carrying out 
federal policies simply by invoking generalized limits on local 
power such as Dillon's Rule. Instead, the state legislature must 
specify the category of local actions that the state deems to be too 
harmful to permit. 
Such a "plain statement" rule serves a purpose analogous to the 
various "plain statement" rules invoked by the Court to promote 
federalism in cases like Pennhurst and Gregory v. Ashcroft. Such 
federalism-promoting canons of construction are sometimes de­
fended as ways of protecting federalism through the national polit­
ical process: they encourage members of Congress to consider the 
values of federalism and take state powers seriously. The presump­
tion of institutional autonomy has an analogous defense. It serves 
the purpose of protecting nationalism through the state govern­
ments' political processes: the presumption fragments the state to 
facilitate federal use of nonfederal institutions, reducing the neces-
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sity for federal legislation that would violate the principle of state 
supremacy. 
Tb.is analogy between federalism-promoting canons of construc­
tion and nationalism-promoting canons of construction illustrates 
an important ambiguity of so-called "political process" theories that 
is frequently ignored by commentators and courts who embrace 
such theories. Such theories can be deployed on behalf of state 
power just as easily as they can be used to vindicate congressional 
discretion. It is, of course, possible that the national political pro­
cess ensures that the interests of state officials will be sufficiently 
respected in the halls of Congress without judicial invalidation of 
federal legislation. But it is equally possible that the interests of 
Congress will be adequately protected in the halls of state legisla­
tures without judicial validation of sweeping federal legislation: 
Congress may be able to obtain through agreement what it is 
barred from obtaining through outright command. Only by careful 
examination of the internal workings of state and local government 
can one determine whether outright federal preemption of state 
and local powers is really necessary to advance the national inter­
est. This article is an attempt to begin this inquiry. 
